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In the Internet, network traffic between endpoints typically follows one path that
is determined by the control plane. Endpoints have little control over the choice of
which path their network traffic takes and little ability to verify if the traffic indeed
follows a specific path. With the emergence of software-defined networking (SDN),
more control over connections can be exercised, and thus the opportunity for novel
solutions exists. However, there remain concerns about the attack surface exposed
by fine-grained control, which may allow attackers to inject and redirect traffic.
To address these opportunities and concerns, we consider two specific challenges:
(1) How can the network determine the choices of paths available to connect end-
points, especially when multiple criteria can be considered? And (2) how can end-
points verify the integrity of the path over which network traffic is sent. The latter
consists of two subproblems, determining that the source of traffic is authentic and
vi
determining that a specified path is traversed without deviation. In this dissertation,
we investigate and present solutions for both the network path finding problem and
the verification problem.
We first address path finding, or routing, which is a core functionality in the Inter-
net. Existing approaches are either based on a single criterion (such as path length,
delay, or an artificially defined “weight”) or use a combinatorial optimization function
when there are multiple criteria. We present a multi-criteria routing algorithm that
can search the whole space of all possible paths. To achieve the scalability of our
solution, we limit the search to only Pareto-optimal paths, which allows us to prune
sub-optimal paths quickly and reduce computational complexity. We show that our
approach is tractable on a variety of realistic topologies and the results Pareto-optimal
paths can be clustered to present a few alternative options.
We then address path verification in the Internet, which consists of source au-
thentication and path validation. Once a path has been selected, we show that an
endpoint can validate that traffic indeed traverses along the chosen path. Prior work
has relied on cryptographic approaches for such validation, which need significant
computational resources. In contrast, we propose a lightweight and scalable tech-
nique to address this problem, which uses a set of orthogonal sequences as credentials
in the packets. The verification of these orthogonal credentials is based on inner
product computations, which can be easily implemented by basic bitwise operations
in a processor. We show that the proposed approach can achieve the necessary se-
curity properties for both source authentication and path validation. Results from
a prototype implementation show that the proposed technique can be implemented
efficiently and only add a small computational overhead.
The results of our work enable novel uses of networks with fine-grained traffic
control, such as enabling more path choices in networks where multiple performance
criteria matter. In addition, our work contributes to efforts to make the Internet more
vii
secure by presenting techniques that allow endpoints to validate the source and path
of network traffic. We believe that these contributions help with improving both the
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Since its birth in the 1960s, the Internet has evolved in many aspects. As the
diversity of uses for the Internet is increasing, many network protocols and archi-
tectures have been developed by the industry and the research community. In these
proposed protocols and architectures, an important developing trend is that the net-
work owners and operators have more controls on their infrastructures and data flows,
allowing customization and optimization, and reducing the overall capital and oper-
ational costs. For example, Software Defined Networking (SDN) and OpenFlow have
emerged as a new paradigm of networking, which transform the current Internet into
an open and programmable component of a larger cloud infrastructure. The benefits
of convenient control on the whole map of the entire network enable the introduction
of new features in Internet to become less manual, less prone to error, and faster to
implement.
Path finding or routing, i.e., determining a path for traffic to flow between com-
municating end-system, is a core functionality in such networks with the data flow
control. In the current Internet, path finding is typically based on a single criterion,
such as path length, delay, or an artificially defined weight. However, networks have
grown in leaps and bounds so that single-criterion shortest paths no longer fit the
whole spectrum of services that exist in today’s networks. Multi-Criteria path prob-
lem has been addressed in several contexts, for example Quality of Service (QoS)
routing. But when there are multiple optimization metrics, most approaches rely
on an combinatorial optimization function, which combines all metrics into a single
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metric (e.g., weighted sum). In contrast to these algorithms, our aim is to search
the whole spectrum of all the possible optimal paths which have advantages even on
any one metric, which can help the network owner or operator is able to take a more
comprehensive consideration.
Once a selected data path is determined by a network owner or operator, how can
they be sure that their preferences are truly enforced is another important concern
in the future Internet. For instance, an enterprise might want the packets that it
receives to pass through several services, such as an accounting service and a packet-
cleaning service. Or a company might want fine-grained control over which providers
carry which traffic between its branch offices, yet the network paths must respect
the providers’ pairwise business relationships. Or providers might want to make sure
that they are carrying traffic only from friendly nations. These abilities of source
authentication of packets and verification of an intended traffic path can help the In-
ternet mitigate various attacks, such as DoS attack, address spoofing, flow redirection
and etc. Unfortunately, the existing approaches either are unable to satisfy security
requirements, or need a lot of computational resources (i.e., based on cryptographic
techniques), which make these techniques expensive to implement in practice since
potentially every packet needs to be checked at line rate. Therefore, in this work,
we design a novel technique for the high-performance source authentication and path
validation in the Internet, especially when considering that the further Internet may
have billions of users with billions of services.
1.1 Path Finding with Multi-Criteria
While more and more network protocols and architectures enable the network
owners and operators to decide intended paths that each data flow has been tra-
versed on, there are usually a multiple choices of different paths that could be chosen.
Widely used routing protocols, such as OSPF [61] and RIP [39], are designed to solve
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this path-finding problem in the network. They use single routing metric and corre-
sponding routing algorithms, such as Dijkstra’s. However, networks have grown in
the diversity of their use so that single-criterion shortest paths no longer fit the whole
spectrum of services that exist in today’s networks. For example, in networks where
the user has the ability to choose paths [22, 83], the cost of a path and the quality
of a path need to be represented by independent metrics. Also, load-balancing and
use of alternate backup paths require multiple paths to be calculated [46]. In these
cases, additional criteria beyond the shortest path metric may be used (e.g., available
bandwidth, path reliability, etc.).
When only a single metric is used, a single optimal solution (i.e., shortest path)
is enough. But when multiple metrics are used, a set of paths needs to be found to
represent the trade-offs among criteria. A key challenge for realizing multi-criteria
routing is the need to develop an efficient algorithm for determining suitable paths in
the potentially very large space of all possible paths (exponential to the number of
nodes). The multi-criteria path finding is an NP-hard [37] problem, but it is possible
to develop solutions for typical-sized networks that work well in practice.
Previous work has addressed the multi-criteria optimal path problem in various
contexts, for example Quality of Service (QoS) routing. A central problem in QoS
routing is to find feasible paths between a source and a destination that satisfy mul-
tiple constraints (e.g., bandwidth, delay). Then, the best path among the feasible
paths is selected based on a given optimization metric (e.g., delay-constrained least-
cost path routing). When there are multiple optimization metrics, most approaches
rely on an combinatorial optimization function [52], which combines all metrics into
a single metric (e.g., weighted sum).
Using a single, combined metric simplifies the path finding problem, but also
presents a fundamental limit on the ability to find solutions: a single optimization
metric requires a priori weighing of each metric [29]. That is, before running the
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path finding algorithm, the relative “value” between different metrics needs to be set.
The result of the search is then optimal (only) for this fixed weighing of metrics. In
practice, however, there are situations where this weighing cannot be done a priori.
For example, a network may allow users to choose a specific path based on price
and quality characteristics [22, 83]. In the marketplace of such a network, different
paths need to be offered before knowing the users’ sensitivity to the price and the
quality (i.e., before knowing their weighting of criteria). Similarly, in SDN [63],
an SDN controller may pre-compute available paths before knowing the weights of
metrics that are desired by a specific northbound SDN application. In such cases, the
weighing can only be done a posteriori and the multi-criteria optimal path problem
needs to find the set of all Pareto-optimal paths. A path is Pareto-optimal if there
is no other path that is better in all metrics. Since multiple metrics allow for the
existence of paths that are better than others in one or more metric, but not all,
there can be a large number of mutually Pareto-optimal paths. Based on the set of
Pareto-optimal paths, one path can be chosen for any possible weighing of metrics
(e.g., by an SDN application or by a network customer).
In our work, we address this multi-criteria path finding problem and design a
high-performance algorithm to find all the possible Pareto-optimal paths, which is
important in practice, especially in environments where different metric weights are
unknown to the pathfinder. The key theoretical and practical research challenges this
work in path finding with multi-criteria tries to address are:
• How to design a path finding algorithm that can find Pareto-optimal paths in
multi-criteria networks?
• How to design it fast enough to find all the Pareto-optimal paths within 1 second
on a typical sized network?
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• How to find a subset of the Pareto-optimal paths in shorter time when the full
Pareto-optimal set is not necessary?
1.2 Source Authentication and Path Validation
After the network owners and operators choose their intended paths for each data
flow, the current Internet typically provides a simple delivery mechanism: we put
destination addresses in packets and launch them into the network. We leave the
network to decide the path that our packets take and the intermediate providers that
the path passes through. Even network operators have little control over the paths
that packets take toward them, or after leaving them. However, more and more
endhosts and ISPs desire to validate service level agreement compliance regarding
data delivery in the network: Did the packet truly originate from the claimed client?
Did the client select a path that complies with the service provider’s policy? Did the
packet indeed travel through the path selected by the client?
The above discussed problems can be divided into two categories: source au-
thentication and path validation, which we term “path verification” in this work.
Source authentication and path validation are two important concepts in networking,
which help construct higher-level security mechanisms, such as mitigating denial-of-
service (DoS) attack, ensuring path compliance and packet attribution, and protecting
against flow redirection. Source authentication is the verification of the source ad-
dress of a host that sends a packet and is designed to determine whether this packet
indeed originated from the claimed source. Path validation confirms that a packet
indeed traversed the path known to (or selected by) the host (i.e., the source). The
latter is used when senders, receivers, or operators want to ensure that a packet’s path
adheres to their preferences. For example, an enterprise might want to dictate that
incoming traffic passes through certain services, such as deep packet inspection [53].
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Path validation provides a way to verify this path compliance according to the policies
of ISPs, enterprises, and data centers.
The current Internet does not provide any effective means for source authentica-
tion and path validation by routers or end-hosts. For example, a network provider
cannot determine if traffic is sent by neighboring providers along paths that match
service-level agreements; a receiver cannot be sure whether a packet is from a specific
source, since an attacker can spoof source addresses in packets. Widely used end-
to-end encryption and authentication schemes (e.g., TLS/SSL) are not able to solve
these issues, since they are agnostic to which path their packets have been forwarded
on. A stronger approach is needed, which enables routers and destinations to perform
source authentication and path validation.
Most of existing approaches to implementing such source authentication and path
validation are typically based on cryptographic schemes (e.g., digital signatures,
HMAC [24] or UMAC [6] that uses a hash of the packet contents with a shared se-
cret in it). They may work well in a domain-specific network with a limited number
of users and dominated by strict security requirements. However, the high compu-
tational cost of cryptographic operations makes these techniques unsuitable for the
data plane of the future Internet, where there are maybe up to billions of users with
billions of services and potentially every packet needs to be checked at Gigabit per
second link rates. Therefore, we design a novel technique for the high-performance
path verification in the Internet, which use a set of orthogonal sequences as “creden-
tials” in the packets. The key theoretical and practical research challenges this work
in source authentication and path validation tries to address are:
• Where to place the credentials in a packet?
• How to design the credentials such that the size of the packet does not increase
with the number of the hops.
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• How to design the authentication mechanism that enables both source authen-
tication and path validation simultaneously, while still providing the necessary
security guarantees?
• How to decrease the router overhead as much as possible?
• How to test and implement such an authentication mechanism?
• How to compare the authentication mechanism with existing cryptographic ap-
proaches?
1.3 Organization and Contributions
This dissertation focuses on the research challenges discussed in Sections 1.1 and
1.2 to address the fundamental problems of the path finding and verification in the
Internet. The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows, with the major contri-
butions summarized in each.
Chapter 2 presents ParetoBFS, a new multi-criteria path finding algorithm to find
all the possible Pareto-optimal paths for the Internet. This algorithm is a variant of
the breadth-first search (BFS) algorithm and uses Pareto constraints to prune the
traversal tree. Comparison with two existing algorithms shows ParetoBFS is tens to
hundreds times faster and find more paths on typical sized networks. This chapter
also shows a sampling heuristic to decreases the running time by only finding a subset
of Pareto-optimal solutions.
Chapter 3 focuses on the source authentication in the Internet. An algorithm
named OrthCredential is proposed to address this problem. OrthCredential uses a
set of orthogonal sequences to verify packets along the path. It provides a fast and
memory efficient method for source authentication. It is also resistant to DoS attacks.
Chapter 4 extends OrthCredential to a new algorithm named OSV ( Orthogonal
Sequence Verification) to further address the path validation problem in the Internet.
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OSV also uses orthogonal capabilities that are carried in packets for verification,
which can be implemented efficiently by basic bitwise operations on a processor. The
experimental results show that the verification time in OSV is much lower than that
existing approaches while providing the necessary security guarantees.
Chapter 5 evaluates the effectiveness and performance of our proposed path vali-
dation mechanism where “Docker” container [1] is used as the experiment tool.
Chapter 6 summarizes the previous chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
PATH FINDING WITH MULTI-CRITERIA
Path finding, or routing, is a fundamental functionality in networking. Path find-
ing in the current Internet uses a single criterion, such as hop count or link weight.
Although there are proposed solutions to the multi-criteria optimal path selection
problem for quality-of-service routing, since the routers eventually need to pick only
one path, they usually combine all criteria into a single path optimization metric a
priori. In contrast to these algorithms, our aim is to search the whole spectrum of all
the possible optimal paths (i.e, Pareto-optimal path) that have advantages even on
any one metric, which can help the network owner or operator is able to take a full
consideration.
This chapter presents ParetoBFS, a variant of a breadth-first search that uses
branch and bound techniques to find all the Pareto-optimal paths while effectively
limiting the potentially very large search space. We present several sampling tech-
niques to further increase the speed of the search while degrading the quality of
the results only marginally. The simulation results show that existing multi-criteria
combinatorial optimization approaches can only search a small fraction of all the
Paretooptimal paths while our ParetoBFS can obtain the whole Pareto-optimal path
set in shorter time. Some of the material in this chapter have been published in [24].
2.1 Introduction
Routing, which is determining a path for traffic to flow between communicating
end-systems, is one of the essential functionalities of any computer network. In typical
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networks, routing is based on a single criterion, such as path length, delay, or an
artificially defined “weight.” Widely used routing protocols, such as OSPF [61] and
RIP [39], use single routing metric and corresponding routing algorithms, such as
Dijkstra’s algorithm [26] and the Bellman-Ford algorithm [13], to efficiently determine
the optimal path between two network nodes.
However, networks have grown in the diversity of their use so that single-criterion
shortest paths no longer fit the whole spectrum of services that exist in today’s
networks. For example, in networks where the user has the ability to choose paths
[22, 83], the cost of a path and the quality of a path need to be represented by
independent metrics. Also, load-balancing and use of alternate backup paths require
multiple paths to be calculated [46]. In these cases, additional criteria beyond the
shortest path metric may be used (e.g., available bandwidth, path reliability, etc.).
When only a single metric is used, a single optimal solution (i.e., shortest path)
is enough. But when multiple metrics are used, a set of paths needs to be found to
represent the trade-offs among criteria. A key challenge for realizing multi-criteria
routing is the need to develop an efficient algorithm for determining suitable paths in
the potentially very large space of all possible paths (exponential to the number of
nodes). The multi-criteria path finding is an NP-hard [37] problem, but it is possible
to develop solutions for typical-sized networks that work well in practice.
Previous work has addressed the multi-criteria optimal path problem in various
contexts, for example Quality of Service (QoS) routing. A central problem in QoS
routing is to find feasible paths between a source and a destination that satisfy mul-
tiple constraints (e.g., bandwidth, delay). Then, the best path among the feasible
paths is selected based on a given optimization metric (e.g., delay-constrained least-
cost path routing). When there are multiple optimization metrics, most approaches
rely on an combinatorial optimization function [52], which combines all metrics into
a single metric (e.g., weighted sum).
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Using a single, combined metric simplifies the path finding problem, but also
presents a fundamental limit on the ability to find solutions: a single optimization
metric requires a priori weighing of each metric [29]. That is, before running the
path finding algorithm, the relative “value” between different metrics needs to be set.
The result of the search is then optimal (only) for this fixed weighing of metrics. In
practice, however, there are situations where this weighing cannot be done a priori.
For example, a network may allow users to choose a specific path based on price and
quality characteristics [22, 83]. In the marketplace of such a network, different paths
need to be offered before knowing the users’ sensitivity to the price and the quality
(i.e., before knowing their weighting of criteria). Similarly, in a Software-Defined Net-
work (SDN) [63], an SDN controller may pre-compute available paths before knowing
the weights of metrics that are desired by a specific northbound SDN application. In
such cases, the weighing can only be done a posteriori and the multi-criteria optimal
path problem needs to find the set of all Pareto-optimal paths. A path is Pareto-
optimal if there is no other path that is better in all metrics. Since multiple metrics
allow for the existence of paths that are better than others in one or more metric,
but not all, there can be a large number of mutually Pareto-optimal paths. Based
on the set of Pareto-optimal paths, one path can be chosen for any possible weighing
of metrics (e.g., by an SDN application or by a network customer). In our work, we
address this multi-criteria routing problem, which is important in practice, especially
in environments where different metric weights are unknown to the pathfinder.
We present ParetoBFS, a variant of the breadth-first search (BFS) algorithm that
uses Pareto constraints to prune the traversal tree. Experiments show that ParetoBFS
can find all Pareto-optimal paths in a network in a reasonable time since typical-sized
networks do not exhibit the characteristics that cause the problem space to become
intractable. The specific contributions of this work are:
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• The ParetoBFS algorithm that can find the entire set of Pareto-optimal paths in
a network where the edges have an arbitrary number of metrics, both sum- and
bottleneck-type. Comparison with two existing algorithms shows ParetoBFS is
tens to hundreds times faster and finds more Pareto-optimal paths.
• A sampling heuristic for ParetoBFS that reduces the number of elements in the
set of Pareto-optimal solutions and thus decreases the complexity of the path
finding process. We show that despite not yielding all optimal solutions, this
heuristic still yields solutions that are useful in practice.
We believe that this work provides a practical foundation for systematically using
multi-criteria routing in networks to develop more effective network control applica-
tions in the future.
2.2 Background
Multi-criteria path finding has been studied extensively in the operations research
community. This problem arises in many practical applications, including route plan-
ning in traffic networks [12] and QoS routing and traffic engineering in communication
networks [78]. If the goal is to find the optimal path with some constraints on one or
more metrics given a directed graph with edges that have a set of metrics, it is called
multi-constrained path optimization (MCPO) [23, 30, 49, 52, 75, 79, 87]. Without the
constraints on the metrics, this problem then becomes the multi-criteria optimization
(MCO) problem [29, 37, 52, 67]. Solutions to MCPO and MCO are usually similar in
that they use a combinatorial function on the multiple metrics (a priori) to find the
optimal path.
The goal of ParetoBFS is to find all the Pareto-optimal paths, which is different
from the prior work. Therefore, ParetoBFS is a broader solution to address both
MCPO and MCO problems since the resulting paths from previous approaches are
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usually a subset of the Pareto-optimal path set. These Pareto-optimal paths are
important in many scenarios. For example, references [46] and [31] each describe a
standalone routing service module that provides paths for other modules. Thus, the
routing service module itself cannot make any choice for metric preferences. Also,
in networks where paths are charged by their qualities, such as ChoiceNet [83], the
cost and the quality of a path need to be represented by independent metrics. In
these problems, there is no single objective function to select the best path, and it is
impossible to give the paths an a priori ranking. Instead, the decision maker needs
to see all the Pareto-optimal paths. Each Pareto-optimal path represents a trade-off
between criteria, and may be equally important for the decision entity.
Section 2.7 compares the performance of ParetoBFS with some prior work in
detail. The experiments show ParetoBFS is tens to hundreds times faster and can
solve broader range of problems.
2.3 Preliminaries
Before describing the ParetoBFS algorithm in Section 2.4, we briefly introduce
the network model and describe the formal definition of our path finding problem.
2.3.1 System Model
We model the network as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes
and E is the set of edges interconnecting the nodes. n and m are the cardinalities of
V and E, i.e., n = |V |, m = |E|, respectively.
To make the problem general enough, we consider that G is a multi-graph, which
means there can be multiple edges between each node pair. (In practice, these
multiple edges can correspond to different services that are offered on the same
physical link, such as different QoS configurations.) In addition, we assume that

















p1 =(A,B,D,F):   512, 12,   8  
p2 =(A,C,E,F): 1024, 10,   9
p3 =(A,B,E,F): 1024, 14,   6
p4 =(A,C,E,D,F): 2048, 16, 14
p5 =(A,B,E,D,F):   1024, 20, 11
p6 =(A,B,C,E,F): 1024, 14, 12
p7 =(A,B,C,E,D,F):1024, 20, 17
 Path list at node F:
 Pareto- 
optimal path.





Figure 2.1. Example of Pareto-optimal path computation from node A to F.
(w1, w2, ..., wk), where k is the number of criteria. Each wi corresponds to one of the
independent criteria used in routing, such as bandwidth, latency, packet pass rate
and cost. A path p from a source vp1 to a destination v
p
r is defined as a finite sequence
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this chapter, the calculation of the path criteria vector must satisfy the following
property: when a hop is added to the path’s end, the optimality of the new path
does not increase on any criterion. Criteria satisfying this property can usually be
classified into two types: sum-type criterion (e.g., delay) where wpi =
∑
eu,v∈pwi(u, v);
and bottleneck-type criterion (e.g., bandwidth) where wpi = min(wi(u, v))
1.
2.3.2 Pareto-optimal Path
To define Pareto-optimality, we first define a dominant path as follows. We use
the notation  to denote the left operand is more optimal than or equals to the right
operand.
Definition 1 (Dominant path) path p dominates path q if and only if
1There are also multiplicative criteria (e.g. link reliability, packet loss rate), but they can be




i ,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}.
and the strict inequality holds at least once.
Then we can define Pareto-optimality as:
Definition 2 (Pareto-optimal path) Path set P is called a Pareto-optimal set if and
only if
p does not dominate q,∀p, q ∈ P.
A path in a Pareto-optimal set is called a Pareto-optimal path.
In this chapter, the goal is to find all the Pareto-optimal paths from a source
node to a target node in a given graph G. For instance, if each edge e ∈ E has
three metrics: bandwidth (w1), delay (w2) and cost (w3), then the set of the Pareto-











3 . This is different from the conventional multi-constrained
optimal path problem [52], where a path optimization function fp is used to combine
all the metrics together and the optimal path is found by calculating the value of
fp on each path. As discussed above, the optimal path computed based on a single
aggregated metric may not meet the multiple constraints being considered.
An example of the type of result we are aiming to obtain is shown in Figure 2.1.
The edges of the graph are labeled with their respective metrics comprising of band-
width (w1), delay (w2) and cost (w3). There are seven paths (p1, p2..., p7) from source
node A to destination node F . Among these paths, path p2 = (A,C,E, F ) is strictly











1 . Therefore, path p5 is not a Pareto-optimal path and would be discarded.
Similarly, neither of the paths p6 and p7 are not Pareto-optimal paths because p2
and p3 is strictly more optimal than them. Finally, we get the Pareto-optimal paths
p1∼4. (In the ParetoBFS algorithm, we maintain a list on each node to record all the
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Pareto-optimal paths to this node and their corresponding parameters. Such a list is
shown in black on node F in Figure 2.1.)
2.4 ParetoBFS : Pruning with Pareto Constraints
In this section, we first describe the plain breadth first search (BFS) solution to
the multi-criteria path finding problem. Then, we describe how we use pruning to
reduce the running time of the algorithm to a practical level.
2.4.1 Plain BFS to Find All Paths
A brute force solution to the multi-criteria path finding problem is to enumerate
all the possible paths, then extract the Pareto-optimal set from them.
Algorithm 1 shows a variant of BFS algorithm that finds all the simple paths
from the source node to a target node. Unlike the normal BFS, it does not maintain
“visited” tags on the nodes, because a node may be visited multiple times when
the algorithm examines different paths. Algorithm 1 starts from a source node and
enqueues it into a path queue, i.e., path queue. Then, the source node is dequeued
and all the directed edges of it are enqueued into path queue as new paths from
the source node to some node in the graph. Each time a path is dequeued from
path queue, it is stored into the path set corresponding to its last node. Meanwhile,
the out-edge neighbors of the dequeued path’s last node are added to its end to
form new paths. These new paths are further enqueued into path queue. To prevent
loops, Line 11 checks whether the neighbor is already in the path before appending
it. After repeating this enqueue and dequeue process until path queue is empty,
path set contains all the simple paths2 from source node to all other nodes. Selecting
a Pareto-optimal set from it is straightforward, as shown in function pareto add of
Algorithm 2.
2A simple path is a path which does not have repeating nodes.
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Algorithm 1 BFS that finds Pareto-optimal paths by enumerating all the simple
paths between two nodes.
1: procedure BFS(G, source, target)
2: for all v ∈ G(v) do
3: path set[v]← ∅
4: end for
5: path queue.push([source])
6: while path queue.length > 0 do
7: path← path queue.pop()
8: s1← path.end()
9: for all edge ∈ s1.out edges() do
10: s2← edge.dest node()
11: if s2 6∈ path then
12: new path← path.append(edge)
13: path set[s2]← path set[s2]∪
{new path}
14: if s2 6= target then





20: pareto set← ∅
21: for all path ∈ path set[target] do
22: pareto set← pareto add(pareto set, path)
23: end for
24: return pareto set
25: end procedure
Algorithm 1 can be easily extended to find the Pareto-optimal paths from one
source node to all the other nodes, by replacing Line 13 with a pareto add function,
removing Line 14, and doing Lines 20 - 23 on each node.
The algorithm is obviously not scalable. In a directed graph, the number of possi-
ble paths is usually exponential to the number of nodes. Moreover, for a multi-graph
with p parallel edges between each pair of nodes, the total number of paths increases
with a factor of ph, where h is the number of hops in a path. Figure 2.2(a) shows
the number of paths traversed in Algorithm 1. It grows exponentially; enumerating
all the possible paths is typically not feasible in both time and space. To make Al-
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Algorithm 2 Pareto-optimal pruning process.
1: procedure pareto add(pareto set, new path)
2: result set← ∅
3: for all path ∈ pareto set do
4: if path is strictly more optimal than new path then
5: return pareto set




10: result set.append(new path)
11: return result set
12: end procedure
gorithm 1 practical, it is necessary to prune the space of paths that are considered
during the traversal.
2.4.2 ParetoBFS – Pruning While Searching
Since our goal is to find Pareto-optimal paths, we can stop considering a path if
it is already strictly worse than other known paths. We call this process pruning.
Formally, during the search process, a path ending with node vi can be pruned if
either of the following conditions satisfies:
1. The path is dominated by a path in the Pareto-optimal path set with destination
node vi.
2. The path is dominated by a path in the Pareto-optimal path set with destination
node target.
An algorithm with such pruning maintains the same theoretical worst-case time
and space complexity. In practice, however, pruning reduces the size of the search tree
dramatically. Note that pruning does not affect the correctness of the final solution,
because extension cannot make a suboptimal path optimal.
Applying the pruning method to Algorithm 1, we can get the ParetoBFS algorithm
as shown in Algorithm 3. Instead of saving all the paths, a set pareto set is used
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Algorithm 3 ParetoBFS
1: procedure ParetoBFS (G, source, target)
2: for all v ∈ G(v) do
3: pareto set[v]← ∅
4: end for
5: path queue.push([source])
6: while path queue.length > 0 do
7: path← path queue.pop()
8: s1← path.end()
9: if path is Pareto-optimal for pareto set[target] and path ∈ pareto set[s1]
then
10: . Check whether the path satisfies the Pareto-optimal conditions
11: for all edge ∈ s1.out edges() do
12: s2← edge.dest node()
13: if s2 6∈ path then
14: new path← path.append(edge)
15: if new path is Pareto-optimal to pareto set[target] and
pareto set[s2] then
16: . see if new path can be added into the
Pareto-optimal path set to node s2
17: pareto add(pareto set[s2],
new path)
18: if s2 6= target then







































































Figure 2.2. Comparison with respect to the number of traversed paths (a) and
running time (b) for ParetoBFS and BFS: a BRITE- generated topology, 2 metrics,
1 parallel edge, and averaging over 60 runs with different graphs and source/target
nodes.
to save the Pareto-optimal paths from the source node to each node. It differs from
Algorithm 1 in Lines 9, 15 and 17. Lines 15 and 17 check the Pareto-optimality before
the enqueue step, to eliminate any suboptimal path. There is another check after the
dequeue step in Line 9, because the Pareto-optimal sets may have changed during
the time that path stays in the queue. Figure 2.2(a) shows that the pruning method
can effectively reduce the number of traversed paths by several orders of magnitude.
The detailed performance and complexity analysis is shown in Section 2.5.
Algorithm 3 can be extended to find Pareto-optimal paths to all other nodes, by
removing the condition checks involving the target Pareto-optimal set in Lines 9, 15
and 18. The running time increases because of the less strict pruning conditions.
2.5 Evaluation and Complexity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of our ParetoBFS algorithm in the
context of network graphs to show that it is practically useful.
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2.5.1 Methodology
To test the performance of the path finding algorithm, we use both generated
topology and real-world topology. Although ParetoBFS can apply to both inter-
and intra-AS topologies, most of the intelligent routing applications are used within
private domains. So we focus on the intra-AS topology here. We use the BRITE
topology generator [60] to generate router-level topologies. The sizes of the topologies
range from 100 nodes to 10,000 nodes. BRITE provides three metrics for paths:
length, bandwidth and latency. When testing with more than 3 metrics, we add
extra random parameters besides these 3 metrics.
BRITE provides four generation models: Waxman [80], BA [10], BA-2 [4] and
GLP [17](the GLP model is mainly for AS-level topologies). The node placement has
two options: random and heavy-tailed. The bandwidth distribution has four options:
constant, uniform, exponential and heavy-tailed. We test all the combinations and
list the running time and the Pareto-optimal path count in Table 2.1. It can be
observed that, except for the constant options, other combinations of parameters do
not show significant difference in the path finding result. Therefore, we can arbitrarily
pick these parameters. In the following experiments, the generation model is set
to Waxman, a most commonly used intra-AS model, the node placement is set to
random, and the bandwidth distribution is uniform distribution.
As for the real-world topology, we use Rocketfuel [73], an ISP topology data set
measured by the University of Washington. Each Rocketfuel data file represents a
topology of one AS, ranging from 100 nodes to 10,000 nodes. The data we use does
not include any metric such as bandwidth or latency, so we randomly generate values
for the metrics using a normal distribution.
Both the generated and the real-world topologies are uni-graphs, i.e., topologies
with only one edge between the same pair of nodes. However, sometimes we need
more than one edge between two nodes, these parallel edges can be either physical
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Table 2.1. Different BRITE parameters does not have significant impact on Pareto-
BFS running time and average Pareto-optimal path count. (1,000 nodes, 3 metrics,






Waxman BA BA-2 GLP
time paths time paths time paths time paths
Random
Constant 0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.03 1.00
Uniform 0.36 7.46 0.26 5.22 0.64 7.42 0.12 2.24
Exponential 0.36 6.60 0.23 4.16 0.62 7.22 0.09 1.94
HeavyTailed 0.42 6.64 0.28 4.84 0.68 7.40 0.12 2.36
Heavy Tailed
Constant 0.04 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.03 1.00
Uniform 0.59 8.46 0.37 5.24 0.89 7.78 0.15 1.98
Exponential 0.52 7.22 0.30 5.78 0.81 7.96 0.15 2.46
HeavyTailed 0.48 7.62 0.25 4.68 0.84 7.76 0.13 2.70
(a) BRITE generated topology, 100 nodes. (b) Rocketfuel topology, AS 4755, 121 nodes.
Figure 2.3. Examples of test topologies.
links with different metrics, or service offerings on the same link but with different
QoS limits. To extend the uni-graphs to multi-graphs, each edge of the uni-graph is
duplicated and assigned with Pareto-optimal metrics.
We use Python to implement our algorithms because of its convenient graph li-
braries, and the ability to integrate into the pox3 SDN controller, which also uses
Python. We use the pypy4 interpreter to run the experiments, which can achieve
3http://www.noxrepo.org/pox/about-pox/
4A Python interpreter with JIT compiler. http://pypy.org/
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performance close to the native code. One exception is the convex sampling in Sec-
tion 2.6, we use CPython for that experiment because the convex hull calculation
uses pyhull, which is not pypy compatible.
The processor we use is an Intel Core2 Quad CPU Q9400 running at 2.66 GHz.
The software configuration is Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit with kernel version 3.13.0-24 and
pypy 2.6.0.
2.5.2 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis on the plain BFS and Pareto-
BFS algorithms (i.e., Algorithms 1 and 3). Let G = (V,E) be the graph, where
V = (v1, v2, ..., vn) is a set of all nodes of the graph and E = (e1, e2, ..., em) is a set of
all edges of the graph. The number of criteria is k. We assume the source node is v1
and the target node is vn.
Recall that Algorithm 1 first finds all possible paths and then the Pareto-optimal paths
among all these paths. On the other hand, Algorithm 3 finds the Pareto-optimal path
each time when it visits a node. We first analyze the time to find all the paths in
Algorithm 1.
As discussed in Section 2.3, a suboptimal path cannot become optimal when a hop
is added to its end. Therefore, all Pareto-optimal paths considered in this chapter are
simple paths, which do not have repeating vertices. In a directed graph, for a simple
path, we can order the vertices so that edges only point forward. E.g., if node u is
a descendent of node v, then node u comes after node v in the sorted list of nodes.
In Algorithm 1, the times that each node vi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is visited are the number
of the paths from source node v1 to node vi. Let v2 be the next node. The number
of paths from v1 to v2 is the number of parallel edges between them. Let v3 be one
of v2’s neighbours, the number of paths from v1 to v3 is the number of (direct) edges
from v1 to v3, plus the paths that use v2 as an intermediate vertex. More generally,
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(a) Number of nodes. (2 criteria, 3 parallel edges)
Number of parallel edges



























Generated topology, 1000 nodes
AS 3967 in Rocketfuel topology, 917 nodes
(b) Number of parallel edges. (2 criteria)
Number of criteria


























Generated topology, 121 nodes
AS 4755 in Rocketfuel topology, 121 nodes
(c) Number of criteria. (3 parallel edges)
Figure 2.4. The time complexity of ParetoBFS to different variables. Each data
point is an average of 30 runs.
24
Number of nodes



































(a) Number of nodes. (2 criteria, 3 parallel edges)
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60 Generated topology, 1000 nodes
AS 3967 in Rocketfuel topology, 917 nodes
(b) Number of parallel edges. (2 criteria)
Number of criteria


































Generated topology, 121 nodes
AS 4755 in Rocketfuel topology, 121 nodes
(c) Number of criteria. (3 parallel edges)
Figure 2.5. The number of Pareto-optimal paths found. Each data point is an
average of 30 runs.
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let e(i, j) be the number of directed edges between node vi and node vj (e(i, j) = 0 if
vi and node vj are not adjacent nodes), and d(j) be the number of paths from v1 to
vj, then we have:




For each node vj, computing d(j) takes time proportional to the in-degree of node
vj, and overall it will take O(m) time. Therefore, Algorithm 1 visits each node O(m)
times, and the total time to find all the possible paths in Algorithm 1 is O(nm) time.
To calculate the complexity of the Pareto selection phase, we denote p as the number
of all the paths from source node v1 to target node vn. p could be 1 if there is only
1 simple path from node v1 to node vn, however, p could also be n! when graph G is
full mesh (each node connects to every other node). The operation of Algorithm 2
takes O(k) times computation for each path in the input pareto set. The process of
screening out the Pareto-optimal paths adds 1 Pareto-optimal path each time from
the temporary pareto set, and the number of paths in pareto set goes from 0 to p−1.
Therefore, the process will compute O(k(1 + 2 + · · ·+ p)) = O(kp2) times. Then, the
running time for Algorithm 1 is O(nm+ kp2).
In contrast to Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3 deletes the non-Pareto-optimal paths from
source node v1 to node vj each time when it visits node vj. Therefore, the number of
paths saved in path queue in Algorithm 3 will be less than that of Algorithm 1. The
number could be the same when all paths are Pareto-optimal . Thus, in the worst
case, Algorithm 3 also visits each node O(m) times. We denote p∗ as the Pareto-
optimal paths between the source node v1 and the target node vn. The total running
time for Algorithm 3 is O(nmkp∗).
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated by the number of the paths
p. In fact, in a typical network topology, p usually grows exponentially with the
number of nodes n. We can take the graph in Figure 2.1 as an example. If we have
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2 parallel edges between each connecting node pairs, then number of the paths from
node A to node F becomes 3 × 23 + 3 × 24 + 1 × 25 = 104, which is much larger
than n (n = 6). Besides, the number of the possible paths doubles when a new node
is added into the graph. On the contrary, the time complexity of Algorithm 3 may
not be dominated by the number of the Pareto-optimal paths p∗ when p∗ is just a
small fraction of p. However, the optimal path fraction would grow rapidly when the
number of considered metrics increases. In this case, the time complexity is dominated
by p∗, and also grows approximate exponentially with n. The experimental results in
the next section indicate the correctness of our analysis here.
2.5.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of the ParetoBFS algorithm.
We first present the running time of the plain BFS and ParetoBFS algorithms in
Figure 2.2(b). It shows that the running time of plain BFS increases exponentially
with the increase of the number of nodes. The complexity of ParetoBFS is sub-
exponential, i.e., the running time may grow faster than any polynomial solution but
is still significantly smaller than an exponential solution. This makes sense because
ParetoBFS ’s running time grows exponentially with the number of nodes in the worst
case, which happens when the number of the Pareto-optimal paths makes up a large
part of the paths between the source and target node. However, in a realistic network
topology, the Pareto-optimal paths are usually a small fraction of the total paths.
So the pruning method can prevent the curve from going too steep, because it keeps
removing non-Pareto-optimal paths at each node, therefore it avoids unnecessary
comparisons afterwards.
We then present the running time of ParetoBFS to find all the Pareto-optimal paths
in graphs with different parameters. Here, we only focus on the running time. The
memory consumption is proportional to the running time, because it depends on
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the length of the path queue. Figure 2.4 shows how the average running time of
ParetoBFS grows with the increasing number of nodes, parallel edges and criteria, re-
spectively. Figure 2.4(a) shows that ParetoBFS can find all the Pareto-optimal paths
on a 10,000-node topology in 30 seconds. Figure 2.4(b) shows a similar complexity
with the number of parallel edges as in Figure 2.4(a). This is also reasonable because
increasing the number of parallel edges and increasing the number of nodes have the
same effect on the traversal queue length, and the pruning methods also have similar
effects on these two metrics. Figure 2.4(c), however, shows a steeper growth than
the previous figures. For instance, if there are a number of k metrics w1, w2..., wk
on each edge (the value of wk is generated randomly), considering two neighboring
nodes with two parallel edges connecting them, the probability that these two edges
are Pareto-optimal is 1− 1
2k−1
. When k grows, the number of the Pareto-optimal paths
between two nodes approaches the number of all the paths between them. This is the
worst case for ParetoBFS which makes the running time grows exponentially. The
large number of metrics also makes the Pareto pruning not working efficiently, which
makes the running time grow faster than in Figure 2.4(a) and 2.4(b). In order to
reduce the running time when the number of metrics is high, Section 2.6 proposes
several sampling methods to reduce the size of the Pareto-optimal set.
Figure 2.5 shows how the number of the Pareto-optimal paths, p∗, grows with the
increasing number of nodes, parallel edges and criteria, respectively. In Figure 2.5(a),
the Rocketfuel-topology curve fluctuates, because each real topology has unique inte-
rior structure which is not as uniform as the generated topology. In Figure 2.5(b), it
can be observed that the number of the Pareto-optimal paths varies linearly with the
number of parallel edges when there are 2 criteria on each edge. The curves show the
correctness of the analytic O(nmkp∗) running time for ParetoBFS in the last section
when compared with Figure 2.4(b). When the number of parallel edges doubles, p∗
and m also double. Therefore, if the curves of p∗ in Figure 2.5(b) can be considered as
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linear, the curves are polynomial in Figure 2.4(b). Figure 2.5(c) shows how p∗ varies
with the number of criteria. It can be observed that p∗ increases in Figure 2.5(c) more
than in Figure 2.5(a) and in Figure 2.5(b). As discussed in Section 2.5.2, a large num-
ber of the criteria results in the number of the Pareto-optimal paths approaching the
number of all the paths.
2.6 Sampling Pareto-optimal Paths
Algorithm 4 Sampling the Pareto-optimal set after adding a path.
1: procedure sampling add(pareto set, new path)
2: result set = pareto add(pareto set, new path)
3: if result set.length > th then
4: sampled set = sampling(result set)
5: return sampled set
6: else
7: return result set
8: end if
9: end procedure
ParetoBFS finds all the Pareto-optimal paths. But as the number of criteria in-
creases, the size of Pareto-optimal set may grow exponentially. Even for a small 1,000-
node network with just 3 criteria, there may be hundreds of Pareto-optimal paths
between two nodes.
Sometimes it is not necessary or too slow to find all the Pareto-optimal paths, so
we introduce a heuristic based on sampling. Sampling the Pareto-optimal set can be
useful in two ways: (1) sampling reduces the difficulty of choice for the entity selecting
among Pareto-optimal paths; (2) if sampling happens during the search, the number
of traversed paths can be further reduced, and the algorithm can find a set of paths
that are close to the Pareto-optimal set in a shorter time.
Algorithm 4 describes how to sample paths. Every time after a path is added to
the Pareto-optimal set, the algorithm checks the Pareto-optimal set size. If the size is
larger than a threshold th, a sampling method is used to reduce the Pareto-optimal set
29
Bandwidth (Mbps)























Paths sampled by the random method
(a) Random sample, th = 10, l = 6.
Bandwidth (Mbps)























Paths sampled by the clustering method
(b) clustering sample, th = 10, l = 6.
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Paths sampled by the convex method
(c) Convex sample, th = 10.
Figure 2.6. The effect of different sampling methods. (2 criteria, 3 parallel edges,
10,000 nodes)
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to l paths. It should be noted that sampling can discard some useful path halfway.
It is possible that the final result is not a subset of the original ParetoBFS result.
Assuming P = {p1, ..., pm} is the Pareto-optimal set found by ParetoBFS , and
Q = {q1, ..., qn} is the Pareto-optimal set found by ParetoBFS with sampling. To
compare the effectiveness of the sampling methods, we propose the following metrics:
• Running Time Ratio (RT) is defined as the ratio of the running time to find Q
to the running time to find P . This metric indicates how the sampling method
affects the running time.
• Path Count Ratio (PC) is defined as the ratio of Q’s size to P ’s size, that
is, PC = n/m. This metric indicates how many Pareto-optimal paths can be
found using this sampling method. It does not indicate the optimality of the
paths.
• Path Quality (PQ) is defined as the average k-dimensional Euclidean distance
between P ’s andQ’s criteria vector sets wQ = {wq1 , ..., wqn} and wP = {wp1 , ..., wpm}.
Each wqi or wpi is a Pareto-optimal path’s criteria vector. To calculate PQ, first
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qi). It can be viewed as the average
distance between wP and wQ, PQ = 0 means Q is a subset of P .
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The sampling method must be fast and be able to process an arbitrary number
of criteria. Assuming there is no preference over any criterion, the sampling methods
should treat each criterion equally. In this section, three sampling techniques are
investigated: random, clustering, and convex sampling.
2.6.1 Random Sampling
This method randomly samples l paths from the Pareto-optimal set. It is fast, but
does not make use of any information of the data points. The result of a 2-criteria
example is shown in Figure 2.6(a). Q mostly overlaps with P , which means that,
after sampling, we can still find an approximate subset of the Pareto-optimal paths.
2.6.2 Clustering Sampling
It is an intuitive idea to cluster Pareto-optimal points that are close to each other
in the k-dimensional space, especially when looking for redundant paths is not the
goal. Here, we use Lloyd’s clustering algorithm [57] to divide the points into l groups,
and select the points closest to the center of each group.
Lloyd’s algorithm’s time complexity is O(nkli) (n being the number of points; k
being the dimension; l being the number of groups; i being the number of iterations).
The example of a clustering result is shown in Figure 2.6(b). The points are more
dispersed than Figure 2.6(a), thus they are more representative.
2.6.3 Convex Sampling
The assumption of convex sampling is that the points on the convex hull are better
than the ones inside. This can be illustrated by Figure 2.7. Points 1-5 are Pareto-
optimal points. Points 1, 2, 4, 5 and the nadir point (not a real data point) forms the
convex hull. Point 3 is inside the hull. Compared to Point 2, Point 3 only improves
a little in bandwidth, but sacrifices a lot in latency. The similar situation applies to
Point 3 and 4. Therefore, Points 2 and 4 seems more preferable than Point 3. This
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Figure 2.7. Example of convex sampling.
method works better if the criterion is sum-type, because the points on the convex
hull are more likely to stay optimal when the path is extended.
We use the qhull library, which implements the Quickhull algorithm [11]. Its time
complexity is O(nlogv) in 2-d and 3-d, and O(nv(bd/2c−1)bd/2c ) for higher dimensions (n
being the number of points; v being the number of points on the convex hull). The
result in Figure 2.6(c) successfully eliminates the points inside the convex hull. For
dimensions higher than 4, the performance of qhull degrades rapidly, it may no longer
help speeding up the algorithm.
The advantage of the convex sampling is that it always reserves the corner points
(e.g. Points 1 and 5 in Figure 2.6(c)), which represent the extreme values in one
dimension, and they are more important if the decision maker wants to choose the
highest value in one dimension. Another advantage is that the calculation of the
convex hull does not require normalizing each dimension, thus improving the speed.
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Table 2.2. The effectiveness of sampling methods.
k th l
random clustering convex
RT PC PQ RT PC PQ RT PC PQ
2 10 5 1.175 0.850 0.141 1.632 0.869 0.004 1.058 0.828 0.001
3 20 10 0.530 0.461 0.022 1.405 0.455 0.026 0.431 0.546 0.007
4 100 10 0.473 0.384 0.030 1.087 0.413 0.032 0.393 0.502 0.030
The disadvantage is that the convex sampling cannot control how many points
are sampled. It is possible that too few or too many points are left, which brings
uncertainty to the quality of the sampling result as well as the running time.
2.6.4 Comparison of Sampling Techniques
We test the three sampling techniques on 9 Rocketfuel topologies, whose sizes
range from 121 to 10,152, and get the average RT , PC and PQ. The results are
listed in Table 2.2. The sampling threshold th and sample size l also affect RT , PC
and PQ. They are chosen from trial runs, to get a compromise between the running
time and the result accuracy.
As for RT , the sampling techniques do not reduce the running speed when k = 2,
but they tend to reduce the running time at higher dimensions. The random and
convex sampling speeds are about the same. The clustering is much slower than the
other two, thus is not recommended. As for PC, all the three techniques can find a
similar amount of Pareto-optimal paths, even for 4 criteria problems, they can still
find 40% to 50% of the Pareto-optimal paths. The convex sampling performs slightly
better at higher dimensions. As for PQ, the convex sampling has the best path
quality, but its PQ increases much faster than the other two, this may be because
the convex sampling cannot control the sample size, so the result accuracy is less
adjustable.
Overall, the convex sampling works the best among the three sampling methods,
at least for k = 2, 3, 4. It is faster, finds more Pareto-optimal paths with higher path
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Figure 2.8. Running speed of Hansen’s algorithm and ParetoBFS. (1 sum-type
metric and 1 bottleneck-type metric, 1 parallel edge, Rocketfuel topology)
quality. Therefore, the convex sampling is recommended when dealing with 2, 3 and
4 criteria topologies.
2.7 Comparison with Related Work
As discussed in Section 2.2, much previous work has addressed the multi-criteria
path finding problem. There are several survey papers and bibliographies [29, 35,
58,76], which summarize more than 40 papers about the multi-criteria shortest path
problem. Unfortunately, most of the papers only deal with sum-type metrics. Only
two papers – Hansen [37] and Pelegrin et al. [67] – consider one sum-type and one
bottleneck-type metric. Gandibleux et al. have a paper considering one bottleneck-
type and an arbitrary number of sum-type metrics [34]. We have implemented
Hansen’s algorithm, and the comparison with ParetoBFS is shown in Figure 2.8.
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RT PC PQ RT PC PQ RT PC PQ
121 1.1 0.56 0.0000 1.3 0.41 0.0000 1.5 0.44 0.0000
609 23.7 0.42 0.0050 178.7 0.38 0.0018 121.2 0.38 0.0003
855 126.5 0.68 0.0000 233.4 0.61 0.0004 258.9 0.53 0.0007
917 34.4 0.41 0.0074 169.6 0.24 0.0008 279.1 0.37 0.0006
The Hansen’s algorithm examined here is Algorithm 2 in reference [37]. It uses a
multiple labeling scheme. Since Hansen’s algorithm finds the exact Pareto-optimal set,
we only compare the running time here.
Figure 2.8 shows the running speed between Hansen’s algorithm and ParetoBFS ,
we can see that ParetoBFS ’s running time grows slower with increasing nodes. Even
for small topologies with a few hundred nodes, ParetoBFS is as fast as Hansen’s
algorithm. For the large topology with 10,000 nodes, ParetoBFS is about 40 times
faster than Hansen’s algorithm. Not to mention that Hansen’s algorithm is only
designed for the bi-criteria problem, while ParetoBFS is capable of dealing with more
criteria.
Other than the exact methods (i.e. to find all the Pareto-optimal paths) like
ParetoBFS and Hansen’s algorithm, many papers propose approximation methods to
find a subset of Pareto-optimal paths in an efficient manner. These are known as
fully polynomial approximation schemes (FPAS). All the FPAS we investigated are
only for sum-type metrics5. Here, we compare ParetoBFS with a popular FPAS –
Martins’ algorithm [59].
5In some work (e.g., [52]), it is suggested that bottleneck types can be converted to sum types




bandwidth(e) , e ∈ p, where p is a path and
e is an edge on p.
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Table 2.4. Comparison of path finding algorithms. (p∗ and p are the numbers of all
the Pareto-optimal and possible paths between two nodes, respectively.)
Type
Number of Number of Pareto-
Complexity
criteria Optimal paths
Plain BFS k p∗ O(mn+ kp2) (p > p∗)
ParetoBFS k p∗ O(mnkp∗)
Hasen’s [37] 2 p∗ O(p∗2 log n)
Martins’ [59]
k sum-type




Martins’ algorithm only gives an approximation of the Pareto-optimal set, which
may differ from the exact Pareto-optimal set. Similarly, we compare the quality of
results as in Section 2.6. The results on 4 Rocketfuel topologies are shown in Table 2.3.
Even for graphs with hundreds of nodes, the running speed of Martins’ algorithm is
tens to hundreds times slower than ParetoBFS . On larger Rocketfuel topologies,
Martins’ algorithm becomes too slow to be feasible. Though Martins’ algorithm finds
a reasonable portion of the Pareto-optimal set (about 40% to 60%) and the quality
of paths is very close to the exact Pareto-optimal set, Martins’ algorithm is too slow
compared to ParetoBFS . Besides, ParetoBFS can find all the Pareto-optimal paths
while Martins’ algorithm only finds a part of them.
Table 2.4 compares the complexity of ParetoBFS with Hansen’s algorithm and
Martins’ algorithm. From the comparison, we can see that ParetoBFS is superior
than prior work in various aspects: It is able to take an arbitrary number of sum-
type and bottleneck-type metrics. Besides, it finds the full Pareto-optimal set faster
than other exact methods. Our experiments also show that it is even faster than
certain FPAS in practice.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we address the problem of finding multiple Pareto-optimal paths in
a network where multiple criteria are used for routing. Such information is necessary
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in networks where path choices need to be provided to consumers for a posteriori selec-
tion. We have described ParetoBFS , an algorithm to find all the Pareto-optimal paths
in a network. The experiments show that the algorithm works well and can get a
solution on a typical network in reasonable time. We have also proposed several
sampling techniques to further reduce the running time when finding all the Pareto-
optimal paths is not necessary or not feasible. We believe that this work presents an




In the Internet, an important problem is to make sure only authorized users (i.e.,
those who have paid for a particular network service) can access the service. Most
existing authentication approaches are based on cryptographic techniques.Most ex-
isting authentication approaches are based on cryptographic techniques. However,
cryptography has high computational cost, making it unsuitable for the data plane of
the network, where potentially every packet needs to be checked at Gigabit per second
link rates. This chapter describes a novel design for data plane access control, called
OrthCredential. The main idea is to use a set of orthogonal sequences as credentials
that can be verified easily to protect the data plane against various attacks. These or-
thogonal sequences can be constructed by Hadamard matrices. The evaluation shows
that OrthCredential only requires less than 300 processor cycles for verification with
64-bit credentials, much less than existing access control schemes such as HMAC. And
it provides reasonable security strength (e.g., less than 10−8 probability of successful
attack). Some of the material in this chapter have been published in [20].
3.1 Introduction
Recently, there has been much interest in the networking community to explore
new network architectures for the future Internet [64]. In many proposed architec-
tures, functionalities in the network are viewed as “network services” [28, 47, 82].
These services can be simple paths between nodes, and they can be more complex
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Figure 3.1. An example of interactions between a user and a provider.
describe the semantics of various network services and allow composition of more
complex services based on users’ needs. To incentivize the deployment of novel ser-
vices by network providers, it has been envisioned that services can be offered in a
marketplace [84]. In this space, users (or their applications) can choose and obtain
necessary network services in return for payments to the providers who offer these
services. A key technical challenge in such a network is to provide access control to
these network services (if explicit payments are used or not). Only traffic sent by
authorized users (i.e., those who have established an economic relationship with the
provider) should be able to access network services that are not offered by default.
Therefore, some form of checking must be applied to the traffic before granting them
access to reserved resources. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the interactions within a
service-oriented network. Once a service contract has established between a user and
a provider, the provider delivers some credentials (or “capabilities” [6]) information
to the user and sets up the service. These credentials (or seed material to generate
multiple credentials) are created by the provider or an entity acting on behalf of the
provider. The user attaches a credential to each request for service, which is created
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via some method (e.g., cryptographic hash) with the secret information. The verifiers
(i.e., edge routers) of providers can validate that a user (or network traffic sent by
the user) is authorized for access by validating the credentials. Therefore, only the
user who sends packets with the valid credentials can access the services.
It is important to note that, the “network” we consider in this chapter is not a
domain-specific network with a limited number of users and dominated by strict secu-
rity requirements, but is the future Internet with up to billions of users with billions
of services. From traditional view, an effective checking mechanism may only require
that authorized packets have some property that is hard for attackers to duplicate,
while easy for legitimate users to create. However, when considering the common case
that millions of packets on a link need to be checked by a router simultaneously, it is
critical to develop authentication methods that can be checked with low performance
impact, while providing sufficient security from access by unauthorized attackers.
This chapter proposes a novel design for data plane credential called OrthCreden-
tial(Orthogonal Credential), which enables access control and can be generated and
verified at high data rates with low processing overhead and low storage requirements.
The main idea of OrthCredential is that the user uses a sequence (credential) which
is orthogonal to the verifier’s sequences. And the verifier checks the inner product of
the user’s credential and the sequence on the verifier. The result of the inner prod-
uct equals 0 means the credential is valid. These orthogonal sequences can be easily
constructed from Hadamard matrices. While designing and enriching access control
protocols has received much attention, our focus is on decreasing the cost to satisfy
data plane devices’ computational capability while guaranteeing an acceptable level
of security. The advantage of OrthCredential is in two aspects: 1) the computation
of inner product of two binary sequences can be done by fast integer operations on
CPU; 2) the verifier only needs to save a few basic orthogonal credentials and a sum
of received valid credentials to check the validity of multiple received packets. The
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OrthCredential scheme has low verification time since inner product computations are
much simpler than cryptographic operations. The main advantages of OrthCredential
can be summarized as follows:
• Low Verification Time: We use an inner product computation to replace
complicated cryptographic operations so that the verification time is signifi-
cantly decreased (less than 350 clock cycles per packet if requiring less than
10−10 attack probability for an attacker to guess a valid credential).
• Enable Powerful Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack Defense: Though ver-
ifying a valid credential requires a number of inner product computations be-
tween the credential and a set of saved orthogonal sequences, detection of an
invalid credential can typically be done in a single inner product computation
that requires very few operations (less than 50 clock cycles).
• Low Memory Consumption in Router: The verifier (i.e., the network
router) only needs to save the sum of received valid credentials and a small part
of the orthogonal sequences, which leads to very small storage consumption per
flow. In the simulation, we will show that a space consumption of no more than
0.1 KB on the router can promise a random attack probability of less than 10−10
while preventing replay attacks simultaneously.
• Small Overhead in Packets: OrthCredential header in a packet is small
(no more than 28 clock bytes) and thus does not cause significant overhead in
packets in the data plane of the network.
3.2 Preliminaries
Before the introduction of OrthCredential system, we begin the discussion with
a description of security requirements, attacker capabilities and incapabilities. Then,
we list the performance metrics considered in our system.
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3.2.1 Security Requirements
This work only considers the problem of the source authentication after a contract
has been established between a user and a provider. In 7.1, we assume that the
communications in steps 1-2 of the iterations are private and the service credentials
(or credential seeds) can not be observed by a third party. This end-to-end security
can be achieved by using existing protocols (e.g., TLS). The system must have the
following security properties to be considered as a solution to our problem:
3.2.1.1 Security Requirements
The authentication system of access control must have the following security prop-
erties to be considered as a solution to our problem:
• Security Strength: In order to provide a secure network infrastructure, it is
crucial that credentials are only available to authorized users in the network.
Therefore, credentials should be difficult to be guessed or faked. Brute force
methods must yield a sufficiently low probability of success that the packets
sent by authorized users is unaffected.
• Verification without Trusting Hosts: The verifier should prevent malicious hosts
spoofing packets. Authenticity should be determined solely from the packet
contents and static per-flow information (e.g., public key or shared secret), and
not from any other host information that changes per-packet.
• Replay Prevention: The authentication mechanism should include a means to
detect reused credentials. This implies that state must be updated on a per-
packet basis, but does not violate the previous requirement, provided the verifi-
cation and anti-replay checks are separate, and update happens only after ver-
ification of authenticity. Given a fixed field size in the packet, this requirement
implies that the number of packets that can be verified is bounded; however,
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it should be large, so that resynchronization is required infrequently, even for
high-data-rate links.
3.2.1.2 Attacker Capabilities
An illegal user, or an attacker, is trying to grant the access to some services
(by sniffing packets from authorized users and extracting the credentials from the
packets, or by some other methods). Figure 3.1 illustrates such attacker’s behavior.
Such attack may interfere with authorized packets, making the user failed to get the
guaranteed service. In some scenarios, this may bring lost revenue to the provider.
Our assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities can be summarized to the following:
• Ability to eavesdrop at some point along the path from the user to the veri-
fier. Sniffing legitimate packets traveling along the path can be accomplished
by breaking into an end system (non-router) connected to a shared-medium
network somewhere along the path.
• Ability to extract the credential information within the packets and pretend to
be the valid users and transmit the packets under correct formats. The valid
credentials can be derived through long-term observation and analysis of the
credentials in the authorized packets.
• Ability to send arbitrary packets or flood a particular link, router, or host to
which it connects, e.g., Denial of Attacks (DoS). By breaking into and taking
control of many end systems within the network, and making them to transmit
bursts of packets addressed to some target simultaneously, the attacker can
cause packets arriving a verifier at a rate close to the capacity of the channel.
Additionally, we constrain the capabilities of the attacker as follows:
• An attacker does not have access to the secret capabilities materials associated
with the credential information between users and providers. As discussed ear-
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lier, we assume that the delivery of the secret capabilities materials is through
strict encryption.
• An attacker cannot stop the legitimate packets along the path (i.e., cannot drop
the network traffic on a router);
• If an attacker transmits a modified copy of an authorized packet, the packet
cannot arrive before the original one.
It is conceivable that the above assumptions all might be violated, which Orth-
Credential system does not defend against. However, the limitations on the attacker’s
capabilities are necessary to keep the discussion of attack scenarios and security re-
quirements within scope.
3.2.2 Performance Requirements
Our model of verifier processing implies some performance constraints on the
authentication check. We assume that authentication can be pipelined with other
operations, and consider only requirements that follow from the basic architecture of
the verifier (e.g., router). The performance constraints on the verification process are
summarized in the following:
• Verification time: the time spent on verification of an arriving packet is vital
for the verifier. Since credentials need to be validated for every packet that ar-
rives in a verifier, they must be verified with low computational requirements.
Furthermore, different credential system may perform differently on the verify-
ing time for an invalid credential and valid credential. The second one is also
important for the verifier, since there may be floods of DoS attacks within the
network.
• Storage consumption: the storage consumption for the credentials is also crucial
for the verifiers, since there are maybe millions of users who have the access
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to the same service. Moreover, packets may arrive the verifier out-of-order.
Verification mechanisms need to allow arbitrary packet order and save related
information within a reserved window.
3.3 Related Work and Alternative Solutions
The problem of access control, or message authentication has received extensive
attentions. Each proposed approach may hold a particular objective, however, cost is
not the major concern of them. Therefore, they are perhaps incapable in a large-scale
network with billions of users and services. In this section, we will discuss existing
authentication schemes into different categories, and present some possible solutions
to our problem and analyze their respective infeasibility.
3.3.1 Ingress Filtering
This mechanism is the early work that investigates DoS attacks, which discards
packets that are not actually from the routes or networks that they claim to be
from [32]. In [66], Paxson considers the fact that most of the traffic a router sees
from a source comes in on the same interface, and use RBF to observe the interface
of the packet sources. If it comes from a different interface, it filters the packet. An
extended work is [27] by Duan, which proposes IDPF by using BGP information to
build a relaxed RBF table. These checks have at least two drawbacks. First, ingress
filtering cannot work well when there are asymmetric routes or protected paths in
the network. Besides, these schemes are slow to respond to routing changes, and may
drop legitimate packets.
3.3.2 IP Traceback
This mechanism is to identify attacks to their source and institute protection
measures of the Internet by using routers to create state so that receivers can re-
construct the path of unwanted traffic [70–72]. Some of these mechanisms require
46
logging per-packet information in routers [71], or save the information in the packets
instead [70]. However, this traceback process is a long and difficult process of identi-
fying and punishing an attacker. In [69], a novel packet-marking scheme called Linear
Packet Marking (LPM) is proposed which requires the number of packets equal to
hop distance between attacker and the victim which is less than 31. It shows that
the LPM algorithm performs much better in term of packets required for successful
traceback and in handling large-scale DDoS attacks. LPM generates small storage
overhead on routers; nevertheless, it also requires a long process of identifying an
attacker. In [90], Yu et al. show that accurate traceback is possible within 20 seconds
(approximately) in a large-scale attack network with thousands of “zombies”.
3.3.3 HMAC/UMAC
The most popular methods for access control is Message Authentication Codes
(MAC) (e.g., HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1 and etc.), which usually involves a cryp-
tographic hash function in combination with a secret cryptographic key, providing
data integrity and the authentication of data origin. The authentication of data ori-
gin gives a confirmation that the message originates by the sender, who shares the
used secret key with the receiver. There are a number of algorithms [15, 36, 56, 86]
that have been developed in the last decade for the construction of “robust” MAC.
UMAC [14] is claimed to be the fastest MAC that has been reported on in the cryp-
tographic literature. Small algorithmic changes were made in 2004 and a number
of UMAC options were eliminated for simplicity [50]. Many new Path verification
Mechanisms (PVM) also generates proofs or credentials based on HMAC/UMAC
(e.g., ICING [62], TVA [89]). However, it is inevitable that cryptographic operations
require expensive computations even for small messages: larger than 150 clock cycles
per block. Besides, in order to avoid replay packets, each router should keep a size of
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window to record received authenticated credentials, which further increase the cost
for each flow that the router supports.
3.3.4 Public-Key Cryptography
A message is encrypted with a recipient’s public key and it cannot be decrypted
by anyone who does not possess the matching private key, who is thus presumed to
be the owner of that key and the person associated with the public key [77]. This is a
classic method of verifying authenticity (e.g., digital signature). It has the advantage
of not requiring any secret information to be distributed to or stored at the verifier.
Only the key associated with the flow is required for verification. Unfortunately,
even the latest signature verification is too computationally expensive. The arriving
packets will trigger credential computations no matter they are valid or not. This
increases the system’s vulnerability to DoS attacks since encryption or decryption
operations require several orders of magnitude more operations than conventional
packet processing [21]. Therefore, digital signature cannot meet the performance
requirements outlined above.
3.3.5 Hop-by-Hop Message Authentication
Some schemes like HCF [42] and HPPD [92], work by associating sources with
hop counts instead of interfaces. The basic principle is that, if a packet comes from
a source with a different hop count, the packet is dropped. The advantage of hop-
by-hop authentication is that it does not require distribution of any shared secret to
verifiers. However, if the attacker can guess the right hop count, spoofing the system
would be easy. Besides, the scheme increases cost because the authentication code of
each packet is both verified and re-generated at each hop.
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3.3.6 Hidden Credentials
There are also many existing work that focuse on carrying out access control with
hidden credentials [16, 40, 51]. In these schemes, the access control policies are used
as keys to encrypt the data. Only the people who meet the conditions specified
in the policies are able to generate the decryption keys. An important work [33]
is by Frikken et al., which improves the performance of hidden credential schemes.
However, all these schemes have very high running cost due to the complexity of the
committed-integer based oblivious transfer protocols. For example, Frikken’s scheme
needs O(ρmn) encryption operations and O(ρ2mn) communications where m is the
number of credentials, n is the number of attributes in a policy, and ρ is the number
of bits used to represent the attributes.
3.3.7 Path Verification
There are many routing security protocols [18,25,41,43,68,91] that ensure the au-
thenticity and correctness of the topology propagation and route computation (e.g.,
S-BGP [43], RBF [68], SCION [91]). These approaches focus on computing the cor-
rect routes while they actually do not ensure that the resulting routes are used in
packet forwarding. Recently, there are also some working focused on path forwarding
and verification, e.g., ICING [62], TVA [89], SIFF [88]. In TVA [89], a source attaches
capabilities to each packet, and each router verifies one capability. The capabilities
are route-dependent, so if the route changes or multipath forwarding exists, legiti-
mate traffic is dropped. In ICING, Naous et al. design a new networking primitive
that enables path consent and compliance perfectly. However, the spoof generation
requires encryption on the whole payload of the packet, therefore the verification
time will also be large. We think these path forwarding or verification schemes are
orthogonal to our OrthCredential mechanism, where low cost authentication for each
flow in routers is our focus.
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In the next, we analyze another two simple but possible solutions to our problem
of source authentication, which helps the understanding of this chapter.
3.3.8 Constant Sequence Credentials
This is the simplest solution, which works as follows: the provider delivers one
or a small number of constant credentials to the user, and the user will send packets
with one of them each time. This method has a tiny cost on verifier since it needs
only to save the constant credentials, and compare the received credential bit by bit
when verifying packets. However, once the attacker has observed any valid credential
then it can replay the credential and gain access to the services all the time.
3.3.9 Pseudorandom Sequence Credentials
This method uses dynamic credentials and is first described in [21] to prevent
replay credentials. After the payment of a user, the provider will inform the user a
seed for pseudorandom number generation (PRNG). Each time when the user wants
to send packets, it uses the seed to generate a new credential. The same process is
done by the verifiers. The potential problem is that in a real network, the packets
may arrive out-of-order, which requires a size of window in verifier to save many
credentials in advance. Other than that, this system is vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Because the verifier will compare the incoming packet with every credential in the
window, no matter it is valid or not. Besides, pure random sequence generation for
hardware is nearly impossible and attackers are easy to obtain the pseudorandom
sequence generation method after a long-term analysis of the packets.
3.4 Overview of OrthCredential
In this section, we describe OrthCredential system in a high level, deferring the
design details to Section 3.5.
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3.4.1 Goals and Non Goals
OrthCredential is an authentication code intended for use in authorizing access
control to reserved network resources to address the requirements in Section 3.2.1.1.
OrthCredential is different from conventional MACs that use cryptographic algo-
rithms. It uses orthogonal sequences as credentials and determine validity by ob-
serving whether their inner product equals 0. The probability of counterfeiting it
is higher than other crypt-schemes, but it is still low enough to be safe. The goal
of OrthCredential is to achieve high performance and low cost for verification by
eliminating some security guarantees that we have discussed above. It needs to be
emphasized that OrthCredential is not designed as a replacement of conventional
MAC algorithms. We believe many MAC schemes perform very well in end-to-end
data transmission for high security demands, but cannot meet the requirements in a
general service-oriented network with billions of services and users.
There are several functions that OrthCredential is not designed for: (i) OrthCre-
dential does not guarantee the security and integrity of the payload in the packet
during packet forwarding; (ii) OrthCredential does not guarantee the security of the
path that the packet goes on. Actually, a secure path between two nodes can be also
seemed as a service and OrthCredential can only provide the access to these secure
paths which are set up by provides.
3.4.2 Deployment Scenario
The natural deployment scenario for OrthCredential is at layer 3 (the network
layer). Consider a path service with given bandwidth guarantees as an example:
The providers would deploy OrthCredential routers at the ingress of their networks
(i.e., edge routers). Internal routers do not need to verify OrthCredential, just as
internal forwarders may implement a different protocol from that of the edge routers.
As shown in Figure 3.1, after the user established a contract with a provider, the
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Table 3.1. A full description of the relevant notations in Chapter 3.
Variables Description
seed The secret information sent to the user and the verifier by the
provider.
n Length of each credential.
k The index of generated Hadamard matrices (k = 1, 2, 3...).
H(k) The kth orthogonal matrix generated by user (k = 1, 2, 3...).
hi(k) The i
th row of H(k) (1 6 i 6 n).
ri(k) The random vector corresponding to hi(k).
key(k) A secret key corresponding to H(k) which is used to generate ri(k).
ci(k) The i
th credential and it satisfies ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k)
m The number of the saved rows of H(k) in the verifier (1 6 m 6 n).
Hm(k) A number of m rows in H(k) that saved in the verifier (router).
hm,i(k) The i
th row of Hm(k) in the verifier (1 6 i 6 m).
c The credential extracted from received packets by verifier.
h The vector computed from c and it is expected to satisfy h = c−ri
for some i.
counter(k) The newest number of the credentials verified as valid, the value
of couter resets when k is updated.
sum(k) The sum vector of vi(k) which is saved in the verifier and sum(k) =∑n
i=1 vi(k), the initial value of sum(k) = 0.
sum bit[i] sum bit[i] saves the ith bit of each entry of sum(k) (1 6 i 6

















































Figure 3.2. Credentials generation and verification in OrthCredential .
provider sets up the service and sends a secret generating seed to both the user and
the edge routers along the transmission path. Each time the user uses the path service
of the provider, the user sends packets with a credential generated by the secret seed.
The edge router of the provider only forwards packets that contain a valid credential.
Therefore, only an authorized user can access the bandwidth provided in the path
service. The generation and verification mechanism of a credential is discussed further
in Section 3.5.
3.4.3 Architecture and Components
OrthCredential is based on the technique of generating a series of sequences with
mutual-orthogonal properties known to the user and the verifier. After a user has
pursued some service from a provider, the provider will set up the service and send a
secret generating seed to both the user and the devices along the transmission path.
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The seed contains the secret information of generating different n×n orthogonal ma-
trices H(k) (k is a numerical order). Besides, the seed also contains the corresponding
keys (denoted as key(k)) for each H(k). Each time a packet is sent, the user chooses
the first unused row vector hi(k) from H(k) (i is the index of rows in c) and generates
a random vector ri(k) by using key(k), then the user can get a credential by:
ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k), where k = 1, 2, 3, ...
A similar process is in the verifier: the verifier will generate Hm(k) which includes
a number of m rows of H(k), and save it in memory. Once all rows from H(k)
are used, H(k + 1) will be generated from the seed. For every packet arriving at
a router, the router extracts credential c and subtracts the corresponding ri(k) and
results h. Then, h is used to compute the inner product with each hm,i(k), row
vector of Hm(k) (∀1 6 i 6 m), to check its validity. Finally, to prevent replay
attacks, h is used to compute the inner product with sum(k), the saved sum of the
received valid orthogonal credentials, to check if c has been used or not, since a used
credential results in a non-zero inner product. If c is verified as valid, then the router
adds h into sum(k) to prevent replay attacks with credential c. Figure 3.2 shows
the entire process that OrthCredential works, where the details will be discussed in
Section 3.5. The concise definitions of the notations we used in this chapter can be
found in Table 3.1.
The security of OrthCredential is based on a very low probability of an attacker
obtaining a credential satisfying that the results of its inner product with each hm,i(k)
and sum(k) equal 0 simultaneously. Even for a replay packet, the result of the inner
product of h (h = c− ri(k)) and sum(k) equals ||h2|| but not 0 either.
In our OrthCredential system, these orthogonal matrices H(k) are Hadamard ma-





Figure 3.3. An illustration of Hadamard matrix and its properties.
Table 3.2. Number of Hadamard matrices of different types.
n 2 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
Types 1 1 1 1 5 3 60 487 13,707,126
3.4.4 Hadamard Matrix
3.4.4.1 Definition
A Hadamard matrix is an n × n matrix H containing entries from the set Z2 =
{−1, 1}, with the property of HHT = nIn.
This equation implies that all distinct rows or columns of a Hadamard matrix are
linearly independent. Therefore, all rows or columns of a Hadamard matrix H are
mutually orthogonal, i.e., have an inner product of 0. We let (v1, v2) denote the inner
multiple computation, then vectors v1 and v2 are said to be “orthogonal” if and only
if (v1, v2) = 0. For instance, v1 = (−1,−1, 1) is orthogonal to v2 = (−1, 1, 0) because
(v1, v2) = (−1) × (−1) + (−1) × 1 + 1 × 0 = 0. In this chapter, we use an “entry”
to denote an element in a vector, for instance, each entry in a row of a Hadamard
matrix is 1 or -1.
An explanation of a Hadamard matrix can be found in Figure 3.3(a), where black
squares represent ‘-1’s and white squares represent ‘1’s. In our OrthCredential system,
we use 0 to represent -1 in the Hadamard matrix. Then, the verification of checking
whether the result of (c1, c2) equals 0 can be simply achieved by checking whether
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the number of ‘0’s equals the number of ‘1’s in the result of bitwise AND operation
c1&c2.
3.4.4.2 Properties
It is proved that, an n× n Hadamard matrix exists for n = 1, n = 2, and n = 4k
for any k ∈ N [45]. We further introduce a basic, but very important, property of
Hadamard matrix:
Theorem 1 Several operations on Hadamard matrices preserve its property: (i) Row
permutation, or changing the sign of rows; (ii) Column permutation, or changing the
sign of columns; (iii) Transposition.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.3: Figure 3.3(a) illustrates an 8 × 8 Hadamard
matrix; in Figure 3.3(b), we change the sign of its fifth and sixth column; in Fig-
ure 3.3(c), we further permute the third and seventh row. After these operations, the
transformed matrices are still Hadamard matrices. Strictly speaking, two Hadamard
matrices H, H ′ are said to be different if H ′ cannot be produced from H by opera-
tions (i)-(iii). Therefore, we say that there is only one Hadamard matrix of order 2,
though it has eight different expressions. Table 3.2 shows the number of inequivalent
classes of Hadamard matrices from n = 2 to n = 32 [45]. When n is larger than
32, the different types of Hadamard matrices are even much larger. These properties
enable us to generate a random Hadamard matrix that the attacker cannot guess each
time, which also limit the possibility of forging it. Even if the attacker can guess one
credential accidentally, which will not be legitimate when the next Hadamard matrix
is generated.
3.5 Design Details of OrthCredential
This section details OrthCredential’s design, which aims to meet the requirements
stated in Section 4.3.
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IP header









Figure 3.4. OrthCredential header, which total overhead in a packet is 16 to 28
bytes.
Table 3.1 describes the notation used throughout our design discussion and our
pseudocode, and Figure 4.3 shows the OrthCredential header format. The header
includes two types of information for each user. The first is the user’s information,
the provider will assign a unique ID for each user who has established a contract
with. The verifier will turn to the corresponding verifying materials by checking this
ID information. The second is the information used for verification: {n, i, k, ci(k)}.
The length of ci(k) (i.e., n) in our current system is 32, 64 or 128 bits. The verifier
will tell the difference by checking n or the “header length” part.
3.5.1 Creating Credentials
As described in Section 3.4.3, a credential ci(k) is given by ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k).
We generate ri(k) by using a random() function with the seed (key(k), k, i). Each ri(k)
is different due to different sets of (key(k), k, i). The reason why we add ri(k) with
hi(k) in OrthCredential system is, if hi(k) can be easily observed by an attacker, the
attacker can get a valid credential by generating lots of sequences that are orthogonal
to hi(k). Therefore, ri(k) can help decrease the probability for attackers to forge a
valid credential. We next describe how to construct an Hadamard matrix and thus
get hi(k).
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People have derived many construction methods to generate a Hadamard matrix
for a given n [8]. The Hadamard construction method in our system is a simple, but
efficient one - Kronecker Product Construction: if S, T are matrices, their Kronecker
Product S ⊗ T is the matrix U constructed by replacing each Si,j in S by Si,jT . It
can be proved that the Kronecker Product Hn ⊗Hm is a Hadamard matrix of order
nm if Hn, Hm are Hadamard Matrices of orders n and m. This implies that we can
get a 2n⊗ 2n Hadamard matrix by the product of an n× n Hadamard matrix with




An illustration of Hadamard matrix construction in OrthCredential system by
Kronecker Product is in Figure 3.5. Before doing Kronecker Product operation, the
original n × n and the basic 2 × 2 Hadamard matrices will take several transform
operations in Theorem 1 first, respectively. Then, the generated Hadamard matrix
will also take several transform operations. All these transform operations are de-
scribed in seed sent by the provider. For the original n × n Hadamard matrix, we
use a Walsh-Hadamard transform to get it. For instance, in Figure 3.3(a), if we
let the bottom row as 0th row and the leftmost column as the 0th column, then its
(i, j)th entry Hi,j can be written as Hi,j = (−1)
∑n







p. The Walsh-Hadamard transform is easy to be realized, since the com-
putation of
∑n
p=1(ip · jp) can be simply achieved by checking the number of ‘1’s in
the result of the bitwise operation i AND j. In real implementations, the verifier will
save a number of basic Hadamard matrices beforehand, since they may be used for
each flow’s verification. In Section 3.6.1.1, we will show that this generation method
can guarantee a very low repeating probability.
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* * *
Transform operations Kronecker ProductPermutation Sign changes*
Figure 3.5. An illustration of an 8× 8 Hadamard construction.
Each time a packet is sent, the user chooses an unused row vector ci(k) as the
credential and places it together with its index k, i in the packet. Once all rows from
H(k) are used, H(k+1) will be generated from the secret seed. We set the maximum
k to 100, and the user will ask for a new seed from the provider when a number of
k Hadamard matrices are used. Each n-bit credential ci(k) (ci(k) = hi(k) + ri(k))





= 0, when i 6= j,(
hi(k), hj(k)
)
6= 0, when i = j.
(3.1)
3.5.2 Verifying Credentials
Algorithm 5 Operations of generating a credential
1: if i%(n+ 1) = 0 then
2: k← k + 1, i ← 1
3: key(k) ← seed(k).key
4: H1 ← Hadamard Transform(n2 )
5: H2 ← Hadamard Transform(2)
6: H1, H2 ← Transform Operation(H1, H2, seed(k))
7: H(k) ← Kronecker Product(H1, H2)
8: H(k) ← Transform Operation(H(k), seed(k))
9: hi(k) ← the ith row of H(k)
10: ri(k) ← Random(key(k), k, i)
11: ci(k) ← hi(k) + ri(k)
12: return (ci(k), k, i)
59
The verifier only generates and saves a number of m rows of H(k) (i.e., Hm(k)),
not the whole matrix. In an implementation, m is ususally 10% − 30% of n. The
value of m depends on the security requirements of the service, and if the verifier
saves the whole H(k) (i.e., m = n) then it can achieve the best protection against
forgery attacks. In Section 3.6, we will show that even a small m can also provide a
very good protection for the access to the service.
For each packet arriving at provider devices, the verifier extracts credential c, then
subtracts the corresponding row ri and finally gets h. Then, h is used to compare
with or compute the inner product with hm,i(k) to verify the validity of c. To avoid
replay attacks, h is also used to compute the inner product with sum(k) to check if c
has been used or not, since a used credential will result in a non-zero inner product.
A received credential c is verified as valid when the following conditions are satisfied:
1. ∃ i (1 6 i 6 m), h = hm,i(k) or











If h satisfies the above equations (i.e., c is a valid credential), the local variable
couter(k) is incremented. Here, couter(k) implies that h is the (couter(k))th valid
credential received by the verifier. In order to protect against a replay attack with
credential c, the verifier will add h with sum(k) and save the result as a new sum(k).
It must be emphasized that: (i) the addition here is between two vectors not two
numbers; (ii) though we use 0 represent −1 in h during verification (as described in
Section 3.4.4), but during this addition operation, h should be the original vector with
entries 1 or −1. Thus, the value of each entry of sum(k) is an integer in the range of
[−n, n]. We next explain the verification details during real implementations:
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… … 
Figure 3.6. An example which shows the relations between sum(k) and {sum bit[i]}
when n = 32.
Step 1: Verify Equation (3.2). The operations of verifying whether the result
of (h, hm,i(k)) equals 0 can be achieved by checking whether the number of ‘0’s equals
the number of ‘1’s in the result of bitwise operation h AND hm,i(k).
Step 2: Verify Equation (3.3). The cost of the verification process mainly
depends on the operations between h and sum(k) when m is small. An intuitive
solution would be represent sum(k) as an array with n integers which are in the
range of [−n, n], and use n iterations to calculate the inner product. However, we
can use the following schemes to decrease the cost to O(log2n):
• Remove negatives in sum(k): during the addition operation between h and
sum(k), we update sum(k) with the result of sum(k) + h + en, where en =
(111...11)n. Therefore, the value range of each entry in sum(k) becomes [0, 2n].
• Recompose sum(k): we use a set of {sum bit[i]} to represent sum(k), where
1 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1. Each sum bit[i] is an n-bit local variable in the verifier and
the jth bit of sum bit[i] denotes the ith bit of the jth entry of sum(k). Figure 3.6
is an example which shows the relations between sum(k) and sum bit[i] when
n = 32. From the above discussion, we know that, each time sum(k) updates
by adding the result of h + en whose each entry is 2 or 0, therefore each entry
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of sum bit[1] is always 0. In real implementations, the verifier does not save
sum bit[1] to decrease the storage consumption.
Algorithm 6 Operations of verifying a credential
1: ri(k) ← Random(key(k), k, i)
2: h ← c− ri(k)
B Step 1: Verify h = hm,i(k) or (h, hm,i(k)) = 0
3: for 1 6 i 6 m do
4: if h = hm,i(k) then
5: break
6: else
7: result ← number of 1s in (h⊕ hm,i(k))
8: if result 6= n/2 then
9: return InValid
B Step 2: Verify (h, sum(k)) = 0
10: result ← 0
11: number h0 ← number of 0s in h
12: number h1 ← number of 1s in h
13: for 1 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1 do
14: number0 ← number of ‘0’s in (h̄ & sum bit[i])
15: number1 ← number of ‘1’s in (h & sum bit[i])
16: result ← result+ 2i−1(number1 − number0)
17: if result 6= couter(k) · (number h1 − number h0) then
18: return InValid
B Step 3: Update sum(k)
19: for 2 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1 do
20: if i = 2 then
21: carry ← h
22: else
23: temp← carry ⊕ sum bit[i]
24: carry ← carry & sum bit[i]
25: sum bit[i]← temp
26: couter(k)← couter(k) + 1;
27: return Valid
By the above schemes, Equation (3.3) could be written as:
couter(k) · (h, en) =
∑log2n+1
i=1
2i−1 · (h, sum bit[i]).
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The computations of inner product in the above equation can be realized by simple
bitwise operations as the same as computing (h, hm,i(k)). Therefore, we reduce the
processing time of verifying Equation (3.3) from O(n) to O(log2 n).
Step 3: Update sum(k). An intuitive solution of updating sum(k) with the
result of sum(k) + h would also need n iterations to accumulate the sum of each
entry in sum(k) and the corresponding entry (1 or −1) in h. However, with the
above representation of sum bits, we can also decease the processing time of updating
sum(k) from O(n) to O(log2 n). As described above, we actually update sum(k) with
sum(k) + h + en, where each entry of the result of h + en is 2 or 0. Therefore, in
real implementations, we will let each entry of sum bit[2] plus 1 if the corresponding
entry of this result is 2. If the addition on a entry of sum bit[2] produces a carry,
then reset this entry and transmit a carry to the corresponding entry of sum bit[3],
and so forth.
In addition to the verifying operations in Step 1, the whole verifying time (count
in clock cycles) is in a scale of O(m + log2 n). In Section 3.6, we will present the
running time under real implementations. The pseudo codes of these algorithms for
generation and verification of a credential are shown in Algorithms 5 and 6.
3.5.3 Attacks
The security of OrthCredential is based on a very low probability of an attacker to
obtain credentials that satisfies Equations (3.2) and (3.3) simultaneously. We briefly
analyze how OrthCredential counters various threats.
An attacker may try to obtain credentials by brute force. We use a part
of n mutually orthogonal vectors (i.e., Hm(k)) to make these “grope around” attacks
impossible. Though the probability that a random vector is (with entries “-1” or
“1”) orthogonal to hm,i(k) cannot be concluded theoretically, we verify the very low
probability for random successful attack by experiments. In our implementation of
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OrthCredential system, this random attack successful probability would be even lower
because a valid credential also has to be orthogonal with sum(k). The results of the
experiments are shown in Section 3.6.
An attacker may try to obtain credentials by replaying the valid creden-
tials sent by the user. We use a sum(k) to perfectly prevent this kind of attack.
It works since once h is verified to be valid, then it will be added into sum(k). Thus,
we have (h, sum(k)) = (h, h) = |h|2 6= 0. If h is expired for k, h will be also verified
to be invalid due to a very low probability that h is orthogonal to each new hm,i(k).
An attacker may try to obtain credentials by generating Hadamard
matrices. OrthCredential provides double protection against this attack. First, as
discussed in Section 3.5.1, the properties of Hadamard matrices guarantee a very low
probability that an attacker generates the same matrix as the user’s. Besides, we use
a dynamic random vector ri(k) to “encrypt” each row of the generated Hadamard
matrix. If the attacker obtains the information of some ri(k) of a user, the attacker
can derive hi(k) by observing the packets sent by the user, it is still very far away
from breaking through the verifier. This is because hi(k) cannot be used directly, the
attacker needs to generate vectors that are orthogonal to hi(k). However, it is still a
very low probability that these generated vectors are orthogonal with all the hm,i(k)
in the verifier.
An attacker may eavesdrop the communications between the user and
the provider. Each time when the credentials generated from seed are run out of, the
user will ask its service provider for a new credential seed. In OrthCredential system,
any end-to-end traffic between the user and provider will be encrypted using existing
protocols (e.g., TLS/SSL). There is no way for an attacker to obtain secret information
by this behavior.
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There are also other attacks described in Section 3.2.1.2 that are out of our as-
sumption of the attackers’ incapabilities and OrthCredential cannot defend against.
Actually, it’s a future work we will consider in OrthCredential.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of security, verification time and
storage consumptions in OrthCredential. We have implemented the algorithm in
C++. We use a PC with an Intel Core2 Quad CPU Q9400 running at 2.66GHz to
test the algorithm’s performance. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit with
kernel version 3.13.0-24 and gcc version 4.8.2. Both the credential generation and
verification codes are compiled in one program with gcc -O3 optimize level. We do
not use platform specific instructions and assembly codes. The time consumed by
each step is measured by CPU clock cycles.
3.6.1 Performance Evaluation
Now, we evaluate the OrthCredential system’s performance on its security, verifi-
cation latency and storage consumption, respectively.
3.6.1.1 Security
We first run simulations to ensure a very low probability of generating a same
Hadamard matrix by the construction method which is described in Section 3.5.1.
During the generating process, we take 3 basic transform operations each time (per-
mutation, changing signs or transposition). We generate 100, 000 Hadamard matrices
for n = 32, 64 and 128 and find the number of the same generated Hadamard matri-
ces among them. The repeatability result is that, when n = 32, the repeatability is
0.18% and it is nearly 0 when n = 64 or 128. Considering that a dynamic random
vector ri(k) will also “encrypt” each row of the Hadamard matrix, we believe that it
is impossible for an attacker to guess a valid credential.
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We then simulate a scenario that an attacker sends random credentials to brute
force the verification process. As discussed in Section 4.5.3, the first step of verifying
a valid credential is to determine whether this credential is orthogonal with each
hm,i(k) while a random credential is hard to achieve this. Figure 3.7 shows the success
probability of such random attack. It can be observed that, when the credential length
(i.e., n) is 128, m > 10 can guarantee the breakthrough probability less than 10−9,
which can be considered safe enough. We can get that, even if the packet transmission
rate of an attacker is as high as 1M pkt/s, then it still needs nearly an hour to guess
a valid credential. Besides, in reality, the Hm,t(k) may change many times during an
hour. For some services with low-security requirements, we consider 32-bit or 64-bit
credentials can also be used with a proper chosen m.
We also simulate a scenario that an attacker sends replay packets, the result is that
all these replay packets are discarded by the verifier no matter the choose of n and
m. There are also other attacks in reality that we cannot simulate, the discussions
can be found in Section 3.5.3.
3.6.1.2 Verification Time
In OrthCredential system, we use computations of inner product to replace compli-
cated cryptographic operations so that the verification time is significantly decreased,
most of the possible computations are simplified to use the basic bitwise operations.
We have tested the different credential length (i.e., n) and different number of
rows of a Hadamard matrix stored on the verifier (i.e., m). Figure 3.9(a) shows the
time needed to verify a valid credential. When m is relatively smaller than n, the
time increases almost linearly with m. That is because, in this case, the probability
that h (calculated from the received credential c) equals a saved hm,i(k) is relatively
small, thus a valid user’s credential has to be calculated against all the m rows of
Hm(k) to get verified. When m approaches n, the verifier has a larger probability of
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Figure 3.7. Success probability of attacks using random generated credentials.
saving a hm,i(k) that equals h, which makes the verification process jump to the sum
verification, therefore the curve becomes gradual.
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, it requires three steps to verify a valid credential,
which runs in a scale of O(m + log2 n) time. The main cost depends on Step 1 and
Step 2 since they both need an operation to count the number of ‘1’s or ‘0’s in a
vector (i.e., POPCOUNT operation), while Step 3 only does the basic AND or XOR
bitwise operations. 16-bit POPCOUNT is done by looking up twice in a 8-bit lookup
table, while 32 and 64-bit POPCOUNT uses a variable-precision SWAR algorithm
introduced in [5]. Because the lookup table method is faster, we can see the time
for n = 16 is almost half of the time when n = 32. 32-bit and 64-bit credential cost
almost the same time, because for a 64-bit CPU, operating a 64-bit integer is as fast as
a 32-bit integer. 128-bit credential needs twice the time of 64-bit credential, because
the CPU cannot do 128-bit integer calculation natively, all the calculations must be
performed as two 64-bit operations. It is worth noting that although some new Intel
x86 CPUs have SSSE3 and SSE4.2 instructions that can do fast POPCOUNT [38],
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Figure 3.8. Probability distribution of the number of the inner product computa-
tions for an invalid packet.
we do not use it because OrthCredential system is platform dependent. If we use it,
the speed can be further improved. Figure 3.9(b) shows the average time needed to
verify a random attack credential. Theoretically, the verifier can discard the invalid
credential within the first few inner product computations in Step 1 due to the low
random attack successful probability. Therefore, the time is much less compared to
verify a valid credential, and it is also nearly irrelevant to m. When n = 16, it takes
a longer time to verify a random credential, this is due to the higher random attack
successful probability, which will lead to a longer verification process. 3.8 shows the
probability distribution of the number of the inner product computations required
for a random credential before it is discarded by the verifier.
3.9(c) shows that the replay attack credentials take almost the same verification
time as a valid credential, albeit none of them will be verified to be a valid one.
This is because a replay credential will not be identified until completing Step 2 –
inner product computation with sum(k). While Step 3 only does serval basic AND
or XOR bitwise operations that require less than 10 clock cycles to proceed, the error
of experiments can cover up this slight difference between 3.9(a) and 3.9(c).
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(a) A valid credential.































(b) A random attack credential.































(c) A replay attack credential.
Figure 3.9. The time for OrthCredential system to verify different types of packets.
Conventional cryptographic schemes will take much more verification time. Ta-
ble 3.3 shows the experiment results of the average per-packet verification cost for
some classical conventional cryptographic algorithms for 500-byte packets (an average
packet length in Internet). These algorithms are also implemented in C++ without
platform specific instructions and assembly codes. To make more comparisons, we
also list the cost of some path verification mechanisms (ICING [62], TVA [89] and
DPCP [81]) in the table. By comparing Table 3.3 with Figure 3.9, we can see the
enormous advantages on the verification speed, especially considering the case that a
DOS attacker floods a path with lots of random attack packets (the verification time
of the schemes in Table 3.3 does not change for random attack packets).
3.6.1.3 Storage Consumption
As illustrated in 4.3, the total overhead of OrthCredential header in a packet is
16 to 28 bytes. In OrthCredential, the storage consumption of the verifier for each
user depends on two parts: a number of m rows of an n × n Hadamard matrix and
a set of {sum bit[i]} where 2 6 i 6 log2 n+ 1. Thus, the whole storage consumption
in the verifier is mn + n log2 n bits. It must be noted that this storage consumption
is under a consideration of preventing replay packets. Many authentication schemes
(e.g., HMAC/UMAC, ICING) cannot provide anti-replay protection naturally and
have to keep a window to save received authorized credentials. In this point of view,
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AES/CTR (128 bit key) 7,277
DMAC (AES) 12,223
ICING (x-hop) 2,080x + 19,520
TVA (x-hop) 3,264x
DPCP (512-bit credential) 34,780
our OrthCredential does not need to save all the newest authenticated credentials,
but uses a sum of the received authenticated credentials instead, which decreases the
storage consumption efficiently. For instance, if OrthCredential uses 64-bit credentials
with 5 rows of a 64× 64 Hadamard matrix to implement verification, then the router
only requires a space of 80 bytes to prevent all possible replay packets while other
conventional cryptographic schemes may need a space of 512 bytes to achieve it.
3.6.2 Deployment on GENI
We have deployed OrthCredential on ExoGENI [9] to demonstrate that the pro-
tocol can work on a real network. We use Netfilter Queue [3] to modify the packets.
The sender inserts a OrthCredential header between IP and TCP header, and sends it
to the verifier. The verifier verifies and removes the header, then forwards the packets
to the receiver. An attacker can send traffic with random credentials. The topology
is shown in Figure 3.10.
We use iperf to generate TCP traffic from both the sender and the attacker to the
receiver. The parameters of the TCP traffic are identical. So if the total traffic of
the sender and the attacker exceeds 100Mbps, they will compete for the bandwidth
to the receiver. The test is divided into 4 scenarios as shown in Table 3.4. When
there is no verification and no attacker’s traffic, the sender can occupy most of the
100Mbps bandwidth. When the attacker joins, it takes almost half of the 100Mbps
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Figure 3.10. Test setup on ExoGENI using flukes.




1 disabled no 89 -
2 disabled yes 42 49
3 enabled no 82 -
4 enabled yes 80 0
bandwidth because of the fairness of TCP. When verification is enabled (with n = 64,
m = 5), the attacker’s traffic can not get through, so the sender can get most of the
bandwidth again. This proves the access control ability of OrthCredential.
Comparing Scenarios 1 and 3, we can see that enabling or disabling the verification
does not have noticeable effect on the sender’s throughput. This is because the
packet forwarding takes far more clock cycles than the verification process. This
demonstrates the low verification time of OrthCredential. Varying n and m also has
little impact on the throughput in our experiment.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter introduces a novel credential design to provide efficient source au-
thentication in the data plane of a network. A new credential design, OrthCredential,
is presented to solve the problem of protecting reserved services with very low over-
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head in terms of verification time and memory consumption, while guaranteeing good
security performance. The prototype implementation has shown a small credential
header (e.g., 20 bytes) can be checked in less than 300 processor cycles and require
less than 800 bits of memory per flow on a router. We believe that OrthCredential




In the last chapter, we presents OrthCredential, which is a novel technique for the
source authentication with very low overhead in routers. This chapter will present
Orthogonal Sequence Verification (OSV), which is a great extension of OrthCreden-
tial, to achieve both source authentication and path validation simultaneously. OSV
also uses orthogonal credentials to enable source authentication and path verification
simultaneously. The verification of these orthogonal credentials is based on inner
product computations, which can be easily realized by basic bitwise operations in a
processor. Therefore, OSV can also significantly reduce computational cost compar-
ing the conventional cryptographic approaches. We present evaluation results which
show that OSV is three orders of magnitude faster than the current approaches based
on cryptographic operations. Therefore, we believe that our work presents an impor-
tant contribution toward realizing high-performance, secure network protocols and
network attack defenses in practice. Some of the material in this chapter have been
published in [19].
4.1 Introduction
Source authentication and path validation are two important concepts in net-
working that help construct higher-level security mechanisms, such as mitigating
denial-of-service (DoS) attack, ensuring path compliance and packet attribution, and
protecting against flow redirection [48]. Source authentication is the verification of
the source address of a host that sends a packet and is designed to determine whether
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this packet indeed originated from the claimed source. Path validation, in particular,
is to validate that the packet indeed traversed the path known to (or selected by) the
host (i.e., the source). The latter is used when senders, receivers or operators would
like to ensure that a packet’s path adheres to their preferences. For example, an
enterprise might want to dictate that incoming traffic passes through certain services,
such as deep packet inspection [53]. Path validation provides a way to enforce this
path compliance according to the policies of ISPs, enterprises, and data centers.
The current Internet, however, is unable to provide efficient means for source
authentication and path validation by routers or end-hosts. For example, a network
provider cannot determine if traffic is sent by neighboring providers along paths that
match service-level agreements; a receiver cannot be sure whether a packet is from
a specific source, since an attacker can spoof source addresses in packets. Widely
used end-to-end encryption and authentication schemes (e.g., TLS/SSL) are not able
to solve these issues, since they are agnostic to which path the packets have been
forwarded on. A stronger approach is needed, which enables routers and destinations
to perform source authentication and path validation.
In recent work, various methods have been proposed for source authentication
(such as TVA [89], SNAPP [65], StopIt [54], AITF [7], NetFence [55], Passport [62],
DPCP [81], and OrthCredential [20]), which cannot be used for path validation.
Current proposed approaches for a combination of source authentication and path
validation are ICING [53] and OPT [48]. However, they are both based on expensive
cryptographic operations that require considerable computational resources. To make
source authentication and path validation feasible for broad deployment, it is critical
to develop methods that have low implementation cost while still providing reasonable
security guarantees.
In this chapter, we present a novel technique for both source authentication and
path verification, called Orthogonal Sequence Verification (OSV). OSV uses capabili-
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ties, i.e., special tokens in the packet, that are checked by routers along the path of a
flow. The main idea of OSV is that the sender and routers use “orthogonal sequences”
of suitably chosen +1 and -1 values. The sender uses its orthogonal sequence as a
credential that identifies the source, and routers add their own orthogonal sequence as
credentials that capture which nodes a packet has traversed. The routers and desti-
nation check the result of the inner product of the sender’s credential and their saved
orthogonal sequences. A valid result (i.e., inner product of zero) indicates that the
packet is from the claimed sender. Similarly, downstream routers and the destination
can verify whether the packet has been forwarded by each of the nodes along the
determined path based on the orthogonal sequence information that is incrementally
updated in the packet. This technique provides an efficient and effective means to
achieve source authentication and path verification. The main advantages of OSP
can be summarized as follows:
• Low Verification Time: We use an inner product computation to replace com-
plicated cryptographic operations so that the verification time is significantly
decreased. The verification time of OSV is less than 0.01µs while ICING is
usually needs more than 24.4µs. OPT could achieve the same verification time
as OSV, but it needs at least 4ms for the key setup process beforehand.
• Low Packet Overhead: OSV header in a packet is small (about 125 bytes).
ICING and OPT’s header size are nearly the same as OSV’s when the path
length is below 4, but they increase rapidly as the path length increases. E.g.,
when the path length is 10, OSV’s packet header is 128 bytes while ICING’s
and OPT’s are 410 bytes and 196 bytes, respectively.
• Independence of Path Length: the properties of orthogonal sequences provides
the advantage of OSV that the packet processing time in routers is almost
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independent of the number of hops that are traversed by the packet. OSV’s
packet header overhead is also almost constant (2 bytes for each one more hop).
4.2 Related Work
Source authentication has been studied extensively, the related work on source
authentication are discussed in Section 3.3.
Current techniques for both path validation and compliance have been proposed
in ICING [53] and OPT [48]. In ICING, the source pre-computes a MAC, Vi, for
each intermediate router Ri. When the packet arrives at router Ri, the router first
reconstructs the MACs for the source and each upstream router using the secret keys
shared with the source and each router and verifies whether the calculated results are
equivalent to each Vi. Then, Ri computes new MACs for each downstream router
using the shared secret key and updates each Vj (j ≥ i). OPT designs a Dynami-
cally Recreatable Key (DRKey) protocol that enables routers to create or recreate
symmetric keys shared with end-hosts on the fly. OPT does not require routers to
store keys shared with sources or other routers, nor perform a MAC computation for
every router on the path. Therefore, this protocol requires each router Ri to compute
much less MAC operation per packet compared to ICING. However, the key setup
process of OPT will take a very long time instead (e.g., about 20ms processing time
in destination node for an 8-hop path). Our evaluation in Section 4.6 shows that
our proposed OSV can significantly reduce the processing latency for packets at the
source, intermediate routers, and the destination.
4.3 Preliminaries
Before we present the design of OSV in Section 4.4, we first describe the design
goals, our security model, and limitations.
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4.3.1 Goals
OSV is designed to achieve both source authentication and path validation with
very low overhead on routers, while guaranteeing an acceptable level of security. The
destination and each intermediate router should be able to determine whether the
packet indeed originated from the claimed source and traversed a specific path. While
many cryptography-based techniques perform very well in terms of security, they do
not meet the performance requirements for environments where source authentication
and path validation are performed for every flow (e.g., service-oriented network with
millions of services and billions of users [85]).
4.3.2 Security Model
In order to provide a rigorous discussion of the security properties of OSV, we
now define the following security requirements and attacker capabilities.
4.3.2.1 Security Requirements
Any system that aims to achieve source authentication and path validation must
have the following security properties to be considered as a solution to this problem:
1. Credential strength: Valid credentials (or capabilities) in packets can only be
generated by an authorized sender in the network. Therefore, credentials must
be based on secret information and be difficult to guess or fake. Brute force
methods must yield a sufficiently low probability of success that they are not
useful in practice.
2. Verification without trust chains: An entity verifying a packet must be able to
do so without having to trust other nodes that have been visited along the path.
Necessarily, the receiver needs to trust the sender since secret key material is
exchanged. However, routers along the path do not need to trust other routers
(and the receiver does not need to trust other routers). Authenticity should be
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determined solely from the packet headers and local per-flow information (e.g.,
public key or shared secret).
3. Identification of denial-of-service (DoS) attack source: Sources of DoS attacks
should be identifiable in order to isolate the attack.
4.3.2.2 Attacker Capabilities
The capabilities1 of attackers that aim to disrupt the source authentication and
path validation system are assumed to be following:
1. Ability to eavesdrop at any point along the path from the source to the destina-
tion. Sniffing legitimate packets traveling along the path can be accomplished
by hacking into an end-host or router or by observing a shared-medium network
link along the path.
2. Ability to send arbitrary packets or flood a particular link, router, or host. This
attack can aim to create a DoS attack, e.g., using a botnet. A packet replay
attack is a special case of this kind of packet injection that also utilizes the
previously described capability.
3. Ability to cause path deviation, which leads to packets being forwarded along
a path other than the path previously determined. For example, an attack can
control an intermediate router and redirect the packet to skip other routers in
the path.
4. Awareness of OSV operation. An attacker may be aware of the computation
process of OSV such as the credential generation and verification.
Additionally, we constrain the capabilities of the attacker as follows:
1Unfortunately, the term “capabilities” is used for two different concepts: tokens carried in
packets and abilities available to an entity. In this case, we refer to the latter.
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5. An attacker does not have access to the secrets associated with the credential
information between users and providers. We assume that the delivery of secret
key material is done through established cryptographic protocols.
6. An attacker cannot stop legitimate packets along the path. Techniques for
avoiding such black hole attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter and are
addressed in related work.
7. If an attacker transmits a modified copy of an authorized packet, this packet
cannot arrive before the original one. This ordering necessary to ensure that
when detecting the replay of a valid credential, the original packet can be iden-
tified by the earlier arrival time. This constraint is typically easy to achieve
since an attacker may require additional computation and potentially routing
detours to create and deliver modified packets with replayed credentials.
In Section 4.6.1, we discuss how the proposed OSV achieves the stated security
requirements.
4.3.3 Limitations
While OSV is effective for source authentication and path validation, there are
several functions OSV is not designed for:
1. OSV does not guarantee the security and integrity of the packet during forward-
ing; After a packet departs a node, any downstream node can send it anywhere.
It seems extremely hard to prevent such misbehavior. However, OSV can con-
tain it: honest nodes drop packets that do not contain a proof of having passed
through every intended prior node on the path.
2. OSV does not provide authenticated information about the location of silent
errors or failures on the path. Intermediate routers or the destination can send
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Provider 1i Provider 2i Provider ki
. . .
. . .
Figure 4.1. OSV’s forwarding process.
an error message to the source, but the source cannot discover where this error
happened if none of the upstream routers initiates the message.
3. OSV does not provide information about whether a packet received any contracted-
for service at a node. For instance, if a sender chooses to send a packet through
a particular node because the node advertised a virus-scanning service, the re-
ceiver can check if the packet was forwarded through the node, but cannot verify
that the packet was actually scanned.
4. OSV nodes can copy packets and send them elsewhere, or pass packets through
hidden nodes. This, too, seems very hard to prevent in a federated environment.
However, unlike in the status quo, OSV senders and receivers can restrict the
path to providers that they trust not to leak their packets.
4.4 OSV Overview
In this section, we describe OSV system in general terms, deferring some design
details to Section 4.5.
OSV is a mechanism that allows each node on a selected path to verify that a
packet indeed originated from the claimed source and followed the selected path. A
deployment scenario for OSV is to implement this verification during layer 3 forward-
ing on OSV nodes at the ingress point of a provider’s network. Internal routers (or
forwarders) do not need to run OSV, just as the internal routers may implement a
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Table 4.1. A full description of the relevant notations in Chapter 4.
Symbols Description
k The path length.
n The length of the credentials, currently we choose n=128.
S The source node.
Ni The nodes in the path, including the intermediate routers and the
destination. (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
c The credential in the forwarded packet which is generated by S.
PV Fi Field in the packet enabling Ni to verify the traversed path. PV Fi
is updated when the packet is forwarded on each intermediate
node.
OVi Field in the packet enabling Ni to verify the traversed path. OVi
is generated by S and remains the same during the forwarding
process.
sumi A sum vector of the valid credentials c received by Ni to prevent
replay attacks. The initial value of sumi is 0.
H The selected n× n Hadamard matrix.
mS The number of rows (i.e., h
j
S) saved in S.
mi The number of rows (i.e., h
j
Ni
) saved in Ri.
KS Local secret of S.
KNi Local secret of Ni.
F (·) Pseudorandom function.
hjS The j
th orthogonal sequence in {h1S , ..., h
mS
S } that is saved in S.
hjS is used to generate c, PV Fi and OVi. (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
hjNi The j
th orthogonal sequence in {h1Ni , ..., h
mi
Ni
} that is saved in Ni.
hjNi is used to both verify the packet source and path.
rjS A pseudorandom sequence corresponding to the j
th orthogonal
sequence in {h1S , ..., h
mS
S } using secret KS , where r
j
S = F (KS |j).
rjNi A pseudorandom sequence corresponding to the j
th orthogonal
sequence in {h1S , ..., h
mS
S } using secret KNi , where r
j
Ni
= F (KNi |j).
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different protocol from that of the border router. In this chapter, each provider or
node along the path is assumed that they do not trust each other, therefore they do
not share secrets.
To communicate with a destination, a source node S chooses the path that it
wants. In this chapter, we do not discuss how S finds that path since our focus is on
the verification. The forwarding process of OSV is shown in Figure 4.1. We divide
this process into 4 steps, which are described in the following. The notation we use
in this chapter is summarized in Table 4.1.
After determining the path, the source node S first communicates with the providers
of the nodes along the path to deliver the credential information (Step 1 in Figure 4.1).
In OSV system, the credential information that is used for verification is generated by
the source node S. During the communication process in Step 1, source node S will
deliver different credential information to each node Ni, respectively. This credential
information is based on the generation of a Hadamard matrix, which was introduced
in Section 3.4.4. In Section 4.5.1, we describe what is the credential information and
how it is generated and delivered to the providers. The generated credentials certify
the provider’s consent to carry packets along that path. In addition, S uses the cre-
dential information to construct the Path Validation Field (PVF) in the packet, which
enables the nodes in the path to verify that the correct path has been followed so far.
During this communication process, the providers also get necessary information for
verification, which they pass on to their respective OSV nodes (Step 2 in Figure 4.1).
Before each packet’s transmission, S uses the credential information to construct
the verification fields in the packet header (Step 3 in Figure 4.1). The packet header
format is shown in Figure 4.3 (the explanation of the lengths of PV F and OVi are in
Section 4.6). Credential c is used for source authentication, PV F and OVi (Original
Validation) are used for path validation.
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When receiving a packet, node Ni performs the following verification steps (Step
4 in Figure 4.1):
• Source authentication: Verify credential c to check whether the packet was sent
from S;
• Path Validation: Verify PV Fi and OVi to check whether the packet is forwarded
on the selected path;
• Field update: If the packet is verified as valid, (1) update the saved vector
sumi, which is the sum of the received valid credentials and used to prevent
replay attacks; (2) update PV Fi to prove to the downstream nodes that Ni has
forwarded the packet.
The details of the verfication is in Section 4.5.3. Finally, when the packet arrives
the destination (node Nk), the same verification process is used to achieve end-to-end
source authentication and path validation.
We note that OSV only considers the problems of the packet authentication in
Steps 3 and 4. We assume that the communications in steps 1 and 2 for connection
setup are private and the service credentials (or credential seeds) are not observed by
a third party. This end-to-end security can be achieved by using existing protocols
(e.g., TLS/SSL). Almost all the related work have made this assumption.
4.5 Design Details of OSV
In this section, we provide details on OSV’s design. We first introduce the setup of
the OSV protocol and then describe the details of packet initialization and verification.
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Table 4.2. Credential information saved in source node S and each node Ni along
the path.
node S node Ni







































Source node S’s rows.
Figure 4.2. An illustration of the splitting of a generated Hadamard matrix.
4.5.1 OSV Initialization
We introduce what are the source/router credential “secrets” and how they are
transmitted between the source node and all the routers, which are Steps 1 and 2 in
Figure 4.1.
When a path of nodes (i.e., < N1, N2, ..., Nk >) is determined by the source
node S, S generates a random n× n Hadamard matrix H locally. Related work has
derived many construction methods for generating a Hadamard matrix for a given
n [8]. The Hadamard construction method in our system is a simple, but efficient one
– Kronecker Product Construction (a detailed description of this construction method
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can be found in Section 3.6. H is different for each connection in the network since
we use random transform operations during the construction process, where a proof
by experiments can be also found in Section 3.6. In Step 1 in Figure 4.1, source node
S delivers to each node Ni several different rows of H (through standard security
protocols that ensure authenticity, integrity, and privacy). Node Ni saves these rows
locally. The remaining rows of H are used by source node S to construct credentials.
The different rows saved in each node Ni are used to verify the further packets sent
from the source node S. An illustration of the splitting of the generated Hadamard
matrix H is shown in Figure 4.2.
In our system, the number of rows, mi, that each node Ni selects is a very small
fraction of H, so that they cannot be used to construct the original H. Besides, each
node Ni is not able to generate the rows saved in other nodes. For example, in our
prototype implementation, n = 128 and mi = 3. Only the source node S is aware of
each node Ni’s orthogonal sequences, while nodes in the network do not know other
nodes’ sequences. We denote the rows of H saved in Ni as {h1Ni , h
2
Ni
, ..., hmiNi}. The
rows used as credentials by S are denoted as {h1S, h2S, ..., h
mS
S }. Therefore, the n× n
Hadamard matrix H generated by source node S can be expressed as:
H = {h1N1 , h
2
N1
, ..., hm1N1 , ..., h
1
Ni
, h2Ni , ...,
hmiNi , ..., h
1
Nk











In addition, source node S also shares its local secret KS with each node Ni, and
Ni also shares its local secret KNi with S. But any given node does not know another
node’s local secret. These secrets KS and KNi are used to generate the pseudorandom
sequence r by a pseudorandom function (PRF) F .
In summary, in Step 1, (1) source node S generates a hadamard matrx H locally;
(2) source node S then delivers specific rows {h1Ni , h
2
Ni
, ..., hmiNi} to each corresponding
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Figure 4.3. OSV header.
provider or node Ni, respectively; (3) source node S delivers its local secret KS to
each node Ni, and each node Ni also delivers its own secret KNi to source node
S. In Step 2 in Figure 4.1, each provider delivers these credential information to
their corresponding nodes for verification and forwarding. Table 4.2 summarizes the
credential information saved in source node S and each node Ni.
4.5.2 Packet Initialization
After introducing the setup of credential information between S and Ni, we now
describe the detailed computing process of an OSV packet initialization. which is the
Step 3 in Figure 4.1:
4.5.2.1 Credential Generation
Each time when source node S wants to send a packet on the selected path, it
puts a credential c in the packet header. Each node Ni along the path then uses the
credential c to verify whether this packet comes from source node S. Each credential
c is constructed by using an unused row in {h1S, h2S, ..., h
mS
S }. When all the rows are
used, source node S will generate a new Hadamard matrix and repeat the Step 1
in Figure 4.1. In real implementations, the source node generates multiple different




each node Ni to avoid repeating step 1.
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We use j to denote the index of an unused row. S chooses this unused row, denoted
as hjS, and computes a pseudorandom sequence r
j
S = F (KS|j). The credential, c, then
is




S + F (KS|j). (4.2)
The reason why we add rjS with h
j
S is that, if h
j
S is observed by an attacker, the attacker
can get a valid sequence by generating lots of sequences that are orthogonal to hjS.
Therefore, rjS can help decrease the probability for attackers to forge a valid credential.
The pseudorandom sequence rjS can help decrease the probability for attackers to forge
a valid credential significantly. Note that each Ni is able to regenerate r
j
S since KS is
shared with them and the index j can be found in OSV packet header.
4.5.2.2 OVi Generation




















The symbol ‘·’ denotes an inner product computation.
We use a random x to increase the variability of OVi in each packet sent from S
leading to a higher security. Because the inner product result of hpNi (1 6 p 6 mi)
of node Ni and h
p′
N ′i
(1 6 p′ 6 m′i) of node N
′
i is always zero, no matter which row is
chosen. More details can be found in Section 4.5.3.
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4.5.2.3 PV F Generation
S generates PV F0, the initial PV F value, as
PV F ← PV F0 = hjS + r
j
S. (4.4)
During the packet’s forwarding process, PV F is updated by each node Ni along the
path, while the credential c and each OVi never change.
After the source node computes c, OVi and PV F , it inserts these values into the
packet header and transmits the packet toward the first node N1. The pseudo code
of the algorithm for packet initialization is shown in Algorithm 7.
4.5.3 Packet Verification and Forwarding
We now describe what each node Ni does when forwarding the packet, which is
Step 4 in Figure 1. This step contains two parts – packet verification and update.
The first part can be further divided into source authentication and path validation.
The second part is performed only when the packet is verified as valid.
4.5.3.1 Source Authentication
This verification step uses credential c in the OSV header. Node Ni computes
source node S’s corresponding pseudorandom sequence rjS = F (KS|j), yielding the
calculated orthogonal sequence (denoted as h, where h = c− rjS). The credential c is
valid when it satisfies
∀p (1 6 p 6 mi), h · hpNi = 0. (4.5)
In Section 3.6, experiments show that it is a very low probability (below 10−5)
for a random h that is orthogonal to all hpNi (1 6 p 6 mi). Furthermore, to prevent
a replay attack, h is also used to compute the inner product with sumi to check if c
has been used or not. An unused and used c (c = h+ rjS) always satisfies h · sumi = 0
and h · sumi = |h|2 6= 0, respectively.
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4.5.3.2 Path Validation
This verification step uses PV Fi−1 and OVi in the OSV header. A packet that
has passed through all the upstream nodes satisfies the following equation:
∃p (1 6 p 6 mi), hpNi · PV Fi−1 = OVi. (4.6)
The above equation is true since node Ni−1 will update the value of PV F in the
packet from PV Fi−2 to PV Fi−1 as the following:
PV Fi−1 = PV Fi−2 + h
x
Ni−1
+ rjNi−1 . (4.7)




S, so we can get










) + hxNi−1 + r
j
Ni−1









As with Equation 4.3, x is a randomly chosen integer ranging from 1 to mp.






































The right side of the above equation equals OVi when x
′ = x in Equation 4.3. There-
fore, OSV can achieve the path validation through updating PV F by each node Ni
along the path.
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We describe the verification on node N1 as an example. When a packet is sent
from S to N1, N1 does the following computation using different h
p
N1
(p = 1, ..,m1):
hpN1 · PV F0 = h
p
N1






N1 finds a specific h
p
N1




that computations with different hjN1 do not cause much overhead since mi is typically
very small in OSV (less than 5). After the verification, N1 updates PV F from PV F0
to PV F1:




= hjS + h
x
N1




where rjN1 = F (KN1|j) isN1’s corresponding pseudorandom sequence. We can observe
that hpN2 · PV F1 = h
p
N2
· (rjS + r
j
N1
), where the result equals to OV2 when p equals to
the x chosen by source node S.
4.5.3.3 Field Update
When the packet passes both source authentication and path validation, node Ni
update PV F in the packet to prove to downstream nodes that it has forwarded the
packet. The operations are discussed above and are shown in the following equation:




where x is a random chosen integer ranging from 1 to mi.
In addition, node Ni needs to update its local variable sumi with sumi ← sumi +
hjS. This sumi can be used to identify replay attacks. This is because, for a replay
packet, the result of the inner product of h (h = c − rjS) and sumi equals ||h2|| but
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Algorithm 7 OSV header initialization pseudo code.
1: function Source Initialization
Require: (a) Generated Hadamard matrix H; (b) Secrets KS and each KNi that Ni
shares with S, respectively.
B The detailed method of generating H is in [20]
2: if all rows in {h1S, h2S, ..., h
mS
S } in H are used then






..., hm1N1 , ..., h
1
Ni
, h2Ni , ..., h
mi
Ni




4: j ← the index of an unused row in {h1S, h2S, ..., h
mS
S }
5: rjS ← F (KS|j)
6: c← hjS + r
j
S
7: PV F ← PV F0 = hjS + r
j
S
8: for each node Ni on the path, where 1 6 i 6 k do
9: rjNi ← F (KNi |j)
10: x← a random chosen integer between 1 and mi









not 0 either. When a new Hadamard matrix is used, Ni resets the value of sumi to
zero.
Using the above process, source authentication and path validation can be achieved.
The pseudo code of the algorithm for packet validation and update is shown in Algo-
rithm 8.
4.6 Evaluation
We present an evaluation of OSV consisting of three aspects: a security analysis
based on our security model, a performance evaluation based on emulation of a broad
design space, and a prototype evaluation based on an implementation in a testbed.
4.6.1 Security Analysis
We describe how OSV meets the security requirements described in Section 4.3.2.
OSV achieves source authentication and path verification by merely requiring that the
source and each node Ni along the path are trusted (since they exchange secret key
information to generate matrices used in OSV). However, no entity along the path
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Algorithm 8 OSV header validation and update (in Node Ni) pseudo code.
1: function OSV header validation and update
Require: (a) Received OSV packet header that contains c, j, OVi, PV F and etc;




2: rjS ← F (KS|j)
3: h← c− rjS
B 1) Source authentication (the detailed method is in [20])
4: for 1 6 p 6 mi do
5: if h · hpNi 6= 0 then
6: Drop the packet
7: if h · sumi 6= 0 then
8: Drop the packet
B 2) Path Validation
9: (Note PV F in OSV header = PV Fi−1)
10: flag ← False
11: for 1 6 p 6 mi do
12: if hpNi · PV Fi−1 == OVi then
13: flag ← True
14: break
15: if flag ==False then
16: Drop the packet
B 3) Field Update
17: x← A random chosen integer between 1 and mi
18: Update PV F ← PV Fi = PV Fi−1 + hxNi + r
j
Ni
19: Update sumi ← sumi + hjS
20: end function
needs to trust another entity. This property holds on any network configuration,
including ones that have malicious routers. Thus, item 2 of the security requirements
is met by design. To examine the other two security requirements, we consider various
potential attacks.
Attack by brute force: The router uses orthogonal sequences hjNi to make these
attacks very difficult. A randomly generated credential has a very low probability to
be orthogonal with all hjNi . For instance, when n = 128 and mi = 3, this probability
is below 10−4.5 (this results is described in more detail in Section VI of [20]). Besides,
this kind DoS attack cannot exhaust computational resources on routers, either, since
the packet is discarded within very few inner product computations, as shown in the
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experiment results in Section 4.6.2.2. Thus, we can achieve item 1 of the security
requirements in Section 4.3.2.
Replay attack: Replay attacks are prevented by use of the sum vector sumi that
is stored in routers. The detection of a replayed credential works because once one
row from a Hadamard matrix (denote as h) has been verified to be valid, then it is
added into sumi by node Ni. Thus, we have (h, sumi) = (h, h) = |h|2 6= 0 while the
use of a valid, unused h still results in 0. Together with item 7 of attacker capabilities,
we can thus ensure that item 1 of the security requirements is ensured under replay
attacks.
Attack by controlling the intermediate router: It means that the attacker
can compromise and learn some set of rows in the matrix H. However, it is impossible
for the attacker to generate the original H since each router Ni only saves a very
small fraction of H (less than 5 rows in a 128 × 128 H). It is also a very low
probability (below 10−5) for a random generated credetnial that is orthogonal to all
hpNi (1 6 p 6 mi) in any other Node Ni. Besides, the matrix H will change when the
rows {h1S, h2S, ..., h
mS
S } in source node S are all used.
Path deviation attack: OSV ensures that a successful verification of PV Fi−1
against OVi implies that a received packet Ni has traversed all routers in the intended
path in correct order. The attacker does not possess KS and h
j
Ni
, which is required to
compute PV Fi and OVi. The verification in Equation 4.6 does not succeed if PV Fi
has not been updated by routers or has been updated in an incorrect order. This
verification ensures that a malicious router cannot mount and attack where traffic
skips routers or traverses them out-of-order. Besides, if a malicious router selects a
path not intended by the source, an honest intermediary router rejects the packet.
Thus, we can achieve item 3 of the security requirements since traffic must come from
the specified source along the intended path.
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Figure 4.4. Packet processing latency of OSV (in a log10 scale).
Attack that compromises secrets: Even if an attacker knows every process-
ing step taken by the source and routers, it cannot create valid credentials or PV Fi
since it does not have the whole secret key material (item 5 of attacker capabilities),
which is shared through established end-to-end security protocols (e.g., TLS/SSL).
The Hadamard matrices are also difficult to be guessed due to their variability. Fur-
thermore, during a packet’s forwarding, we add a pseudorandom sequence r with
orthogonal sequence h, which avoids that an attacker can observe h directly.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that OSV achieves the stated security
requirements and thus provides effective source authentication and path validation.
4.6.2 Performance Evaluation
Next, we evaluate OSV with respect to the desired performance properties. We
have implemented the credential generation and verification algorithms in C++. We
use a PC with an Intel Core2 Quad CPU Q9400 running at 2.66GHz to obtain per-
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formance results. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit with kernel version
3.13.0-24 and gcc version 4.8.2. For our evaluation, we choose n = 128 and mi = 3.
4.6.2.1 Setup Latency
We first briefly evaluate the processing costs of Step 1 in Figure 4.1. The main
cost in this setup process is the time for the source node S to generate the Hadamard
matrix H. As mentioned in Section 4.5.2, S generates multiple Hadamard matrices at
a time to avoid repeating Step 1 frequently. In our implementation, we let S generate
100 Hadamard matrices at a time, which can guarantee transmitting about 10,000
packets without repeating Step 1. We run the experiments by using paths with a
number of 3, 5, 8 and 10 hops, respectively. The results have minor difference and
concentrate around 0.15ms. This is much lower than OPT, e.g., for a 8-hop path,
OPT needs about 20.68ms to setup the connection according to Table 3 in [48] (there
is no result for the setup time for ICING).
4.6.2.2 Packet Processing Latency
We evaluate the processing costs of an OSV packet initialization in source node
S, and the verification in nodes Ni along different hops in the path. The results of
our experiments are shown in Figure 4.4 (note that the unit is ns and y-axis is in a
log10 scale). We can see that the packet process latencies of OSV in source node and
routers are all below 0.01 µs.
We first measure the time of a source S to initialize a packet. We let S initialize
the packets with different Hadamard matrices H and different secret keys (KS and
KNi). The results in Figure 4.4 show the average time by running 1 million iterations.
The latency for initializing a packet in source node S increases linearly with the path
length, since a longer path requires the source to perform more calculations on OVi.
For the verification time on routers (node Ni in the path). We use a kernel packet
generator to generate different packets and send them through the software router
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implemented on our experimental platform. For each run, the packet generator sends
1 million packets of each type to the router. We record the average time for the router
to process each type of packet. We use 3 types of packets for this evaluation: packets
with valid credentials, packets with replayed credentials, and packets with random
credentials. The latter use arbitrary bit values for credentials, PV F and OVi. The
results show that the verification time for a replay packet or an arbitrary packet are
much less than for a valid packet. The reason is that invalid packets are discarded
in the credential verification process. In particular, arbitrary packets are discarded
within very few inner product computations with hjNi . We also observe that the
verification time in routers is independent of the path length, because the router does
not perform any computation that depends on the path length. (Actually, a router
in OSV has no information about the path length in OSV.) The latency of verifying
the packet in Ni is less than generating a packet in S. We believe that this slight
difference does not affect of the efficiency of OSV, since the source node S typically
has a lower traffic throughput than routers.
Since OSV uses inner product computations to replace expensive cryptography
computations, its processing time is significantly lower compared to ICING and OPT.
The verification time of ICING [53] in routers is 2.6k + 24.4µs (k is the path length)
for each valid packet, which is hundreds of times more than in OSV. In OPT, the
verification time in routers is in the same scale as OSV’s. But the time for the setup
packet is too long, for instance, for a 8-hop path, OPT needs about a time of 20.68ms
to setup the connection.
4.6.2.3 Packet Overhead
We first examine how we decide the length of PV F and OVi in the OSV header,
which is shown in Figure 4.3. According to Equation 4.3 (which is an inner product
computation), the maximum value of OV is 128 log k, where k is the path length.
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Figure 4.5. Packet overhead varying with increasing path length in bytes.
Therefore, we believe 2 bytes is sufficient to save this value. According to Equation 4.7
(which results in a vector), the maximum length of PV F is 128 log k (note that it is
the length, not the value).
Considering that paths with more than 30 hops are very rare in the Internet [44],
we set the length of PV F as 80 bytes. Based on these assumptions, an OSV header
includes 12+16+80=108 bytes that do not depend on the packet’s path length. Only
2 bytes that are needed for each node Ni. An comparison of the packet overhead
of OSV, ICING, and OPT is shown in Figure 4.5 for varying path lengths. Using
the same pessimistic estimate of an average provider-level path length of 5, as in
ICING [53], our packet header overhead is 118 bytes, which is 57.5% and 89.3% of
the overhead of ICING (205 bytes) and OPT (132 bytes), respectively. Besides, in
Figure 4.5, we can observe that the packet overhead of OSV is almost independent of
the path length. Therefore, OSV has a smaller network bandwidth overhead compared
to ICING and OPT.
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4.6.2.4 Storage Consumption
We now evaluate the storage overhead in the source node and routers. As discussed
in Section 4.5.1, the source node needs to save the Hadamard matrix H, a table of the
indices of the selected rows in H by each node, and k secret keys KNi of each node
Ni. Note that during the setup process of Step 1 in Figure 4.1, S generates multiple
Hadamard matrices and deliver multiple sets of {h1Ni , ..., h
mi
Ni
} to corresponding Ni.
But, after that, S only saves one Hadamard matrix locally. When the rows of the
current matrix are all used, it will generate a new one and also only save the new one.
Compared to ICING and OPT, OSV requires more space on the source node, be-
cause saving H and a table of indices required about 3 kilobytes. Each node Ni needs
to store mi orthogonal sequences (16 × 3 = 48 bytes), the secret key KS (16 bytes)
and a sum vector sumi (16× log 128 = 96 bytes). This leads to a total requirement of
160 bytes. Note that the router storage overhead is under a consideration of prevent-
ing replay attacks. Many authentication scheme including ICING and OPT cannot
provide anti-replay protection by default and have to keep a modestly sized cache
at each node: From this point of view, OSV can decrease the storage consumption
since it only saves the sum of the received valid credentials while other authentication
schemes need to save all the received valid credentials. For example, when OSV uses
a space of 96 bytes to prevent all replay packets, other authentication schemes need a
16× 16 = 256 bytes space. Even if the additional cache for preventing replay attacks
is not considered, the storage overhead for OSV in routers is almost the same as for
ICING and OPT.
4.6.3 Deployment on Testbed
We have deployed OSV on ExoGENI [9] to demonstrate that OSV can work in
a real network. We use the Netfilter Queue to insert the OSV header between TCP
and IP headers. In the experiment, we let source node S generate traffic at a rate of
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Throughput without OSV (4 hops)
Throughput with OSV (4 hops)
Goodput with OSV (4 hops)
Throughput without OSV (12 hops)
Throughput with OSV (12 hops)
Goodput with OSV (12 hops)
Figure 4.6. Throughput and goodput of OSV for 4-hop and 12-hop paths, in the
context of varying payload sizes.
100Mbps and we observe the traffic sent from the intermediate routers. We compare
the throughput when the nodes use and not use OSV protocol, and show OSV is a
lightweight and scalable protocol.
We first examine OSV’s overhead in terms of per-packet processing by measuring
both the throughput and the goodput (the bandwidth used to transmit the payload of
the packets, excluding OSV header). The results are shown in Figure 4.6. We can see
that no matter what size of the payload is, enabling or disabling OSV protocol does
not have noticeable effect on the throughput. This is because the packet forwarding
takes far more time than the OSV process. This demonstrates the low verification
time of OSV which is shown in Section 4.6.2.2. Cryptography schemes like ICING
and OPT, in contrast, have lower throughput for small packet sizes due to computa-
tional demands. For instance, ICING can only achieve about 50% of the maximum
throughput when the payload size is 256 bytes. We can also observe the goodput of
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Throughput without OSV (256B)
Throughput with OSV (256B)
Goodput with OSV (256B)
Throughput without OSV (1024B)
Throughput with OSV (1024B)
Goodput with OSV (1024B)
Figure 4.7. Throughput and goodput of OSV for 256B and 1024 packets, in the
context of varying path lengths.
OSV increases as the packet size increases. This is because OSV header represents a
smaller fraction of the total packet size as the payload size increases. The goodput
of OSV with a 4-hop path is slightly higher than that with a 12-hop path is due to a
smaller OSV header size. Besides, the source node needs to generate new Hadamard
matrices and deliver the credential information to each router more frequently when
the path length increases.
We then examine the OSV’s scalability with respect to the path length. We
perform tests with a minimum path length of 2 hops and a maximum path length of
16 hops. The results are shown in Figure 4.7. As the same in Figure 4.6, enabling
or disabling OSV protocol does not have noticeable effect on the throughput. The
goodput of OSV decreases slowly when the path length increases. This is because the
OSV header size only increases 2 bytes for each additional hop, and the computing
process of OSV in the router is irrelevant to the hops of the selected path. ICING
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and OPT’s goodput both show a faster decrease with increasing path length. We use
the results from Figure 4.7 to compare with Figure 7 in [48]: when the packet size
is 256 bytes, OSV’s per-hop goodput degradation ratio is 57.8−51.0
57.8·14 = 0.84%, while
OPT’s is 3.03% and ICING’s is 5.74%; when the packet size is 1024 bytes, OSV’s
per-hop goodput degradation ratio is about 74.7−69.2
74.7·14 = 0.53%, while OPT’s is 1.25%
and ICING’s is 2.80%. Furthermore, when the path length is 2, OSV’s goodput
is 57.8
83.0
= 69.6% (for 256B packet size) and 74.7
83.0
= 90.0% (for 1024B packet size),
respectively, which is also better than OPT and ICING (they are both 62% for 256B
packet size and 85% for 1024B packet size). Therefore, OSV always has a better
goodput compared to ICING and OPT.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present a novel technique for both source authentication and
path verification, called OSV (Orthogonal Sequence Verification). OSV uses orthogo-
nal capabilities that are carried in packets for verification, which can be implemented
efficiently by basic bitwise operations on a processor. Our experimental results show
that the verification time in OSV is much lower than that existing approaches while
providing the necessary security guarantees. We believe that Orthogonal Sequence
Verification represents an important step toward more security in networks by pro-




In this chapter, we will use “Docker” [1] as the tool to evaluate the effectiveness
and performance of our proposed path validation mechanism. Container is a form of
lightweight virtualization, which provides an alternative means to partition hardware
resources among users and expedite application deployment. Container technique is
gaining increasing attention in recent years and has become an alternative to tra-
ditional virtual machines. Some of the primary motivations for the enterprise to
adopt the container technology include its convenience to encapsulate and deploy
applications, lightweight operations, as well as efficiency and flexibility in resources
sharing [74].
5.1 Setup
A single host can have multiple containers running on it. The containers may have
to communicate with each other and by using docker networking. There are multiple
container networking modes on a single host, where we choose “bridge mode” in our
deployment. As shown in Figure 5.1, Docker creates a bridge named docker0 in the
host OS once the Docker daemon dockerd is launched. When a new container is
started, a pair of veth ports are created to connect the container to docker0. All
containers connecting to Docker0 belong to one virtual subnet and can communicate
with each other using private IP addresses. Bridge mode alone does not connect
containers to external networks and relies on other services, such as NAT and overlay,
for inter-host communication. Bridge mode allows each container to own an isolated
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Figure 5.1. Container networking on a single host.
network namespace and an IP address, and all intercontainer communications need
to go through the docker0 bridge.
We deploy two different docker containers as a source node and a router on a single
host. The host is a PC with an Intel Core i7 Quad CPU running at 2.7 GHz.These two
containers are connected to one Docker0 bridge and have no connection to external
networks, so that we can evaluate their performance. These two containers both
boot from a Ubuntu18 docker image and are allocated with a separate cpu core [2],
respectively. The source node and route use python scripts to generate, send, receive
packets and do verification on the credentials in them. Figure 5.2 shows the usage
of the scripts on source node and router. In the deployment, we will evaluate the
performance when the credential length is 32, 64 and 128.
5.2 Defense on Packets with Random Credentials
We first want to show the security effectiveness of our algorithm that can defend
the attacks from the packets with random credentials. Figure 5.3 shows an example of
using scripts to send and receive packets with random credentials between source and
router (credential length is 64). We can see that the verification results are “false”.
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(a) Usage of python script on source node. (b) Usage of python script on router.
Figure 5.2. Usage of the python scripts on source node and router to generate, send,
receive packets and do verification on the credentials in them.
We simulate a scenario when an attacker sends random credentials with different
credential lengths (i.e., n) and the number of credentials used on the router (i.e.,
m). As explained in Section 4.5.3, a credential is verified as “valid” should satisfies
two conditions. The first condition is that the credential passes the verification of
the saved credentials in the router, another condition is that the credential passes
the verification of the saved sum of received credentials in the router. If the router
does not receive any valid credential yet, the sum will be zero and any credential
can satisfy the second condition. So our simulation includes the cases of the router
received valid credentials or not.
Figure 5.4 shows the success probability of such random attack varying with an
increasing number of saved credentials in the router. We can see that, after the router
receives valid credentials (labeled as “with sum” in the figure), the success probability
becomes lower. It can be also observed that, when n = 128 and m > 8 or when n = 64
and m > 12, it can guarantee the breakthrough probability less than 10−6, which can
be considered safe enough. We can get that, even if the packet transmission rate of
an attacker is as high as 10,000 pkt/s, then it still needs nearly 2 minutes to guess
a valid credential. During the 2 minutes, the source node might already change a
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(a) Send packets with random credentials on source
node (credential length is 64).
(b) Receive packets with random credentials on
router.
Figure 5.3. Send and receive packets with random credentials between source node
and router (credential length is 64).
Figure 5.4. Successful probability of attacks of packets using random credentials,
including the cases that the router received valid credentials or not.
multiple of Hadamard Matrices. For some services with low-security requirements,
we consider 32-bit or 64-bit credentials can also be used with a proper chosen m.
5.3 Defense on Packets with Duplicate Credentials
In this section, we simulate a scenario where an attacker sends replay packets. We
send a number of packets with valid credentials to the router first. Then, we send the
same packets to the router again and the result is that all these replay packets are
discarded by the verifier no matter what the credential length is. Figure 5.5 shows
an example of using scripts to send and receive packets with duplicate credentials
between source and router (credential length is 64). We can see that the verification
results are “false”.
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(a) Send packets with duplicate credentials on
source node (credential length is 64).
(b) Receive packets with duplicate credentials on
router.
Figure 5.5. Send and receive packets with duplicate credentials between source node
and router (credential length is 64).
(a) When the number of creden-
tials used on router is 3.
(b) When the number of creden-
tials used on router is 10.
(c) When the number of creden-
tials used on router is 20.
Figure 5.6. The forwarding rate of the router varies with increasing sending rate of
the source node when the credential length is 64 and the number of credentials used
on router is 3, 10 and 20, respectively.
5.4 Evaluation on Verification Overhead
In this section, we evaluate the overhead of the router that takes the verification
on the receiving packets from the source node. Our experiments records the packet
forwarding rate on the router with increasing packet sending rate from the source
node with and without our verification mechanism. As mentioned in Section 5.1, the
source node and router uses a different CPU core and both have enough memories,
so we think they do not interfere with each other. When the experiment is running,
we can use command “docker stat” to observe the cpu usages of the source node and
the router, which are both nearly 100%.
Figure 5.6 shows the forwarding rate of the router varies with increasing sending
rate of the source node when the credential length is 64 and the number of credentials
used on router is 3, 10 and 20, respectively. The experiments record the results when
the source node sends packets with valid, random and replay credentials, respectively.
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Figure 5.7. The maximum forwarding packet rates with increasing number of cre-
dentials used on the router with different credential length.
Besides, in order to analyze the overhead of the router due to the extra verification,
we also record the results when the source node send packets without credentials. In
this situation, the router does not need to do verifications on them. We can observe
that, when the number of credentials used on the router is 3, the forwarding rate
of the router goes to a limit that is around 2500pkts/s for verifying the valid or
replay packets. This number is around 2300 and 2000pkts/s when the the number
of credentials is 10 and 20, respectively. However, the forwarding rate is around
3150pkts/s and does not change much when the the number of credentials changes.
This is because the router can discard the invalid credential within the first very few
inner product computations.
As shown in Figure 5.7, we compare the maximum forwarding packet rates with
different credential length and different number of credentials used on the router. We
can observe that the forwarding packet rates for packets with random credentials are
very close when the credential length changes. The reason is because the inner product
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computation does not take much resource no matter the length of the credential is.
We can calculate the overhead is about extra 15% processing time for the router. For
the packets with valid and replay credentials, the overheads vary with the increasing
credential lengths. From Figure 5.4, we can know that it would be secure enough when
number of credentials used in the router is 10 for the 128-bit credential. Therefore, we
can calculate that the maximum possible overhead for verifying the valid and replay




The exponential growth of the current Internet has been extraordinary. An impor-
tant developing trend of the current Internet is that the network owners and operators
has more controls on their infrastructure and data flows, allowing customization and
optimization, and reducing the overall capital and operational costs. The benefits of
convenient controlling the whole map of the entire network enables the introduction
of new features in Internet becomes less manual, less prone to error, and faster to
implement.
This work addresses some fundamental problems in the current Internet. The first
one is the path finding, i.e., determining a path for traffic to flow between communi-
cating end-system, which is a core functionality in such networks with the data flow
control. In typical networks, path finding is based on a single criterion, such as path
length, delay, or an artificially defined weight. However, networks have grown in leaps
and bounds so that single-criterion shortest paths no longer fit the whole spectrum
of services that exist in todays networks. Multi-Criteria path problem has been ad-
dressed in several contexts, for example Quality of Service (QoS) routing. But when
there are multiple optimization metrics, most approaches rely on an combinatorial
optimization function, which combines all metrics into a single metric (e.g., weighted
sum). In contrast to these algorithms, our aim is to search the whole spectrum of all
the possible optimal paths that have advantages even on any one metric, which can
help the network owner or operator is able to take a full consideration.
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Another fundamental problem this work address is the path verification, which
can be divided into source authentication and path validation further. Most of the
existing approaches are either unable to satisfy security requirements or need signif-
icant computational resources due to cryptographic operations, thus limiting their
suitability in practice where potentially every packet needs to be checked at line rate.
This work presents OrthCredential(orthogonal vredentials) and OSV (orthogonal se-
quence verification), two lightweight and scalable technique to address the source
authentication and path validation, respectively. OrthCredentialand OSV both use
orthogonal capabilities to enable source authentication and path verification simul-
taneously. The verification of these orthogonal capabilities is based on inner product
computations, which can be easily realized by basic bitwise operations in a processor.
Therefore, OrthCredentialand OSV significantly reduces computational cost, while
achieving the necessary security properties.
We believe the design and implementation of the path finding and verification
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